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Organizational Responsiveness to Anti-offshoring 
Institutional Pressures 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study explores the extent to which organizations are responsive to pressures from 
institutional constituents against offshoring of information technology and business processes. 
Drawing on a theoretical framework that integrates institutional and strategic explanations, it 
proposes that organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures is a function 
of both the characteristics of such pressures as well as organizations’ prior success with 
offshoring. Results based on moderated hierarchical multiple regression analyses on survey data 
from 84 offshoring client organizations indicate the following.  
First, both greater organizational expectations of enhanced social legitimacy obtained from 
compliance and mimetic influences from other organizations led to greater organizational 
responsiveness. Second, despite the strong precedent, organizational dependence on a key 
pressuring constituent had no effect. Third, both conflict of institutional expectations with 
organizational goals and greater regulatory environment uncertainty reduced responsiveness. 
Fourth, surprisingly, organizational success with offshoring had no direct effect on 
responsiveness. However, it attenuated the otherwise strong positive effect of social legitimacy 
and exacerbated the negative effect of regulatory environment uncertainty. Implications of these 
findings for research and practice are discussed.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Offshoring
1
 of Information Technology (IT) and Business Processes (BP) has grown 
dramatically during the past decade and is expected to continue growing (e.g., Willcocks, Cullen, 
and Craig, 2010). For example, in the year 2010, IT offshoring alone was estimated to be a $70 
to $80 billion market with a capacity to grow to about half of the currently $800 billion IT 
outsourcing market (Iyengar, 2011a). Parallel to this explosive growth, negative sentiments 
surrounding offshoring have evolved within the realms of public opinion and concerns of 
professionals from relative quiescence to a much broader back-lash and political uproar against 
offshoring (e.g., Mankiw and Swagel, 2006; Rottman and Lacity, 2004). A September 2010, 
legislative attempt in the United States (U.S.) Senate titled “S.3816 - Creating American Jobs 
and Ending Offshoring Act” illustrates2 the extent to which such broader anti-offshoring 
institutional pressures
3
 have become pervasive.  
1.1 Statement of Research Issue 
Despite the anti-offshoring institutional pressures, it is difficult to imagine that offshoring 
as a sourcing strategy will disappear. The current levels of offshoring and future growth 
projections seem to suggest otherwise. For example, industry predictions from organizations 
such as Gartner, IDC, Everest, and NASSCOM suggest an annual IT offshoring growth rate of 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this study, we define offshoring broadly. It refers to the process of sourcing business functions 
supporting domestic or global operations from abroad, in particular from lower-cost emerging economies, either 
through a wholly owned subsidiary (captive offshoring), a third-party provider (offshore outsourcing), or a hybrid 
arrangement [e.g., Manning, Massini, and Lewin, 2008]. 
2 This bill failed to become law. Section 2 provides an in-depth examination of anti-offshoring institutional pressures 
within the United States 
3 The phrase ‘anti-offshoring institutional pressures’ is used here broadly to denote expectations or demands from 
institutional constituents that organizations should reduce or eliminate offshoring. The institutional constituents 
include, but are not limited to, the general public and public opinion, governments, regulatory structures, laws, 
professions, and interest groups. This view of institutional constituents and pressures is consistent with prior 
literature (e.g., Oliver, 1991; Goodstein, 1994; Scott, 1987; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
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12% or higher during the years 2010-2015 (Lacity, Khan, Yan, and Willcocks, 2010). Gartner 
Research found that in light of increased cost pressures due to the recession, many organizations 
reported renegotiating existing domestic outsourcing contracts for a lower dollar amount in 
exchange for lower levels of service and/or more offshore delivery (Iyengar, 2011a; Tramacere, 
2011). From this perspective, the extent to which organizations engage in offshoring seems to be 
more a function of economic imperatives and organizations’ strategic considerations than of anti-
offshoring institutional pressures. 
On the other hand, it is unreasonable to assume that organizations will outright resist such 
pressures. Smith and McKeen (2004) reported that executives are cognizant of the “optics of 
offshoring” and consider such issues in making offshoring decisions. Research firm Technology 
Partners International, suggests that during 2011, “U.S. and Canadian companies exhibited 
growing preferences to keep outsourced work within their countries, often because of sensitivity 
about data security or offshoring in general” (Reynolds, 2011). A ‘CIO Magazine’ article 
(Overby, 2010) suggested that IS executives can prepare for potential anti-offshoring legislation 
(a significant manifestation of anti-offshoring pressures) by dealing with suppliers which have a 
larger U.S. presence and/or by incorporating contractual provisions to buffer against significant 
anti-offshoring legislation (Overby, 2010). An indirect indicator of such responses from 
organizations is the ramping up of onshore delivery capabilities by offshore service providers 
(Iyengar, 2011b).  
In summary, it is difficult to imagine organizations as invariably conforming or resistant 
to anti-offshoring institutional pressures. That is, the extent to which organizations are 
responsive to institutional pressures for the elimination (or at least reduction) of offshoring 
remains an empirical question. Indeed, organizational responses related to offshoring may not be 
Khan, Shaji, 2012, UMSL, p. 3 
 
 
dichotomous in this regard: They are likely to fall on a continuum ranging from conformity to 
resistance. But what explains the extent to which organizations are responsive to such pressures? 
1.2 Gaps in the Broader Literature  
The current offshoring literature predominantly points to the economic and strategic 
drivers of offshoring. While labor costs savings remain the primary economic driver of 
offshoring (e.g., Kaiser and Hawk, 2004; Khan and Fitzgerald, 2004; King and Torkzadeh, 2008; 
Rao, Poole, Raven, and Lockwood, 2006; Sobol and Apte, 1995), a variety of strategic 
considerations have evolved. These range from access to qualified personnel, faster delivery 
speeds, business or process performance improvements, access to new markets (e.g., Carmel and 
Tjia, 2005; Kaiser and Hawk, 2004; Rao et al., 2006; Sobol and Apte, 1995), and the conduct of 
core activities such as innovation (Lewin, Massini, and Peeters, 2009; Willcocks et al., 2010). 
There is ample indication in the literature that firms do accrue the strategic benefits which 
initially led them to consider offshoring (e.g., Lewin and Peeters, 2006a; Lewin and Peeters, 
2006b; Tate et al., 2009). The literature also suggests that there is substantial variation in terms 
of the extent of benefits derived by client firms (e.g., King and Torkzadeh, 2008; Lacity and 
Rottman, 2008). 
While the strategic aspects of offshoring are well studied, unfortunately, the current 
offshoring literature is silent on the impact of anti-offshoring institutional pressures. Further little 
is empirically known about the prominence of organizational strategic considerations vis-à-vis 
institutional considerations. Given its critical relevance for clients, suppliers, and public policy in 
terms of both client and supplier countries, scholars have called for a more systematic 
examination of such broader institutional pressures against offshoring and their impact on the 
future of sourcing (Lacity et al., 2010 pp. 414-415).  
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1.3 Research Purpose and Questions 
Thus, the purpose of this research is to develop and test a theory based model that relates 
both the characteristics of anti-offshoring institutional pressures and organizations’ strategic 
considerations with organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures. We 
develop a conceptual model based on Oliver’s (1991) theoretical framework and test its 
predictions using data from a survey of 84 offshoring client organizations. The context of this 
study is information technology and business process offshoring.  
Specifically, the model draws on Oliver’s (1991) theoretical framework to suggest the 
following. 1) Characteristics of anti-offshoring institutional pressures will predict organizational 
responsiveness to such pressures. 2) The greater the organizations’ success with offshoring the 
lower the organizational responsiveness. 3) Interactions between organizations’ success with 
offshoring and characteristics of anti-offshoring institutional pressures will also predict 
organizational responsiveness.  
Thus, this research addresses the following broad questions in the context of offshoring.  
1) How responsive are organizations to anti-offshoring pressures? 
2) Do characteristics of anti-offshoring pressures determine organizational responsiveness?  
3) Does organizational success with offshoring determine organizational responsiveness?  
4) Does success with offshoring interact with characteristics of anti-offshoring pressures to 
determine organizational responsiveness?  
In terms of delimiting the purpose of this research (Creswell, 2009) it 1) does not take a 
pro- or anti-offshoring stance 2)  is not concerned with the potential consequences of 
organizational conformity or resistance to anti-offshoring institutional pressures, and 3) is not an 
attempt to assess the “true” macro-economic and societal impacts of offshoring.  
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The rest of this manuscript is organized as follows. In section 2, we examine anti-
offshoring institutional pressures in detail. In section 3, we review literature on the drivers and 
outcomes of offshoring with a particular focus on institutional theory based explanations of 
outsourcing decisions. Next, we describe the theoretical framework which forms the basis for 
this study in section 4. In section 5, equipped with the literature review, theoretical framework, 
and a better understanding of the nature of anti-offshoring institutional pressures, we develop a 
set of hypotheses. In section 6, we then describe the research methodology. Following this, we 
discuss the research findings (section 7), describe the implications for research (section 8) and 
practice (section 9), and list the limitation and suggestions for future research (section 10) prior 
to concluding.  
2 ANTI-OFFSHORING INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES  
Anti-offshoring institutional pressures are part of a broader backlash against global labor 
arbitrage. Just as earlier attempts of manufacturing firms to move production to destinations with 
lower overall costs of doing business, the phenomena of IT and BP offshoring began to gather 
negative sentiments (Gupta, Seshasai, Mukherji, and Ganguly, 2007). These anti-offshoring 
pressures are evident across a broad spectrum of institutional constituents, such as the political 
spheres, state and federal level legislative attempts to curb offshoring, public opinion, 
professionals, and special interest groups such as labor unions, among others. The logic held 
behind anti-offshoring pressures is simple: offshoring hurts labor market and firms should curb 
offshoring so as to prevent domestic jobs from being sent offshore (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006).  
The political backlash against offshoring became vociferous when high profile politicians 
joined the fray (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006). For example, in the United States, 2004 presidential 
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candidate Senator John Kerry made a series of comments such as “We will repeal every single 
benefit, every single loophole, every single reward for any Benedict Arnold CEO or corporation 
that take [sic] American jobs overseas.
4” This was happening at the backdrop of growing 
negative public opinion about offshoring. In November of 2003 a public outcry was cited as the 
reason, the Governor of the state of Indiana cancelled a $15.2 million contract previously 
awarded to an Indian IT supplier, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS)
5
. A 2004 UBS/Gallup 
opinion poll of investors revealed that “[M]ost investors not only oppose outsourcing6, but also 
support strong actions to limit its use by corporate America. (Jacobe, 2004a, emphasis added).” 
Broader public opinion polls showed a similar backlash and an anti-offshoring stance. A 
CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll revealed that 60% of Americans considered a negative impact of 
offshoring on U.S. jobs to be an important issue that is likely to affect their vote in the coming 
2004 presidential election (Jacobe, 2004b). Parallel to this, media commentators such as Lou 
Dobbs, formerly at CNN, made a virtue out of condemning offshoring. In a rather interesting 
exposition, Lacity and Rudramuniyaiah (2009) analyzed the public opinion with respect to 
outsourcing and offshoring as reflected in U.S. and Indian political cartoons. Based on content 
analyses of 165 cartoons from U.S. and India, the authors found that U.S./Western cartoons 
typically portrayed outsourcing and offshoring negatively. Common themes were job loss for 
workers and poorer customer service for consumers. The Indian cartoons, on the other hand, 
typically depicted jobs gained as well as the labor and infrastructure constrains caused by the 
rapid growth of IT and BP offshoring (Lacity and Rudramuniyaiah, 2009). 
                                                 
4 (Reported in Washington Times editorial as John Kerry’s statement following a win in the southern primaries in 
Virginia and Tennessee; Washington Times Editorial, May 30, 2004; Similar statements reported in The Wall Street 
Journal, February 12, 2004) 
5 http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/87537/State_agency_cancels_controversial_outsourcing_deal (Retrieved 
on 04/01/2011) 
6 The term “outsourcing” is often used in the popular press and common parlance to denote “offshoring” 
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Professional associations such as the Programmers Guild maintain offshoring and work- 
visas (e.g., H1-b and L-1 visas that allow foreign nationals to temporarily work in the United 
States) as key issues. They continue to call for action against offshoring and for elimination of 
work visa programs.
7
 Calls for action include, contacting legislature, rebutting “pro-offshoring 
studies”, and protests/demonstrations against large corporations which offshore. Powerful union 
groups such as the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) and the Communication Workers of America – Local 4250 have also long been 
vocal and active against offshoring and work visas
8
. Further, research has shown that 
professionals in the United States are wary of offshoring. For example, IT professionals perceive 
it as a threat to their job security, believe that it has a negative impact on their work and family 
life, and are predominantly in favor of union based and legislative protectionist measures against 
IT offshoring  (Bruce and Martz, 2007; Knapp, Sharma, and King, 2007). Even senior IS 
scholars have acknowledged that the negative perceptions of all IT jobs being offshored have 
caused a serious decline in enrollments within IS and Computer Science programs across U.S. 
universities (e.g., Hirschheim, Loebbecke, Newman, and Valor, 2007; Hirschheim and Newman, 
2010; Kaarst-brown, 2010). While some consider this to be primarily a problem of incorrect 
perceptions (Hirschheim and Newman, 2010), others have acknowledged that offshoring is the 
new reality (Beulen, 2010). Yet others argue that offshoring has an overall positive impact on 
national economy but recognize the significant negative sentiments toward it (Gupta, 2010). 
                                                 
7 Programmers Guild, available online at: http://www.programmersguild.org/offshoring.asp (Retrieved on March 25, 
2011). 
8 AFL-CIO, available online at: http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec03112004i.cfm  and 
http://act.aflcio.org/c/18/p/dia/action/public/index.sjs?action_KEY=760 (Retrieved on March 25, 2011). 
Communication Workers of America – Local 4250, available online at: http://www.cwalocal4250.org/outsourcing/ 
(Retrieved on March 25, 2011) 
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The anti-offshoring public sentiments and political rhetoric have also transformed into anti-
offshoring legislative attempts (Shao and David, 2007). Lawmakers at the state and federal levels 
have proposed bills which either directly target offshoring or have an indirect impact on it. In 
terms of legislative attempts at directly restricting offshoring, bills barring government 
contractors from performing work outside the respective state or United States have emerged. 
Other bills include: preference systems for contract awards at the state level; mandatory 
disclosure of geographical location in calls to and from offshore call centers; ban on transmission 
of personal or financial information of customers abroad without complying with a set of 
conditions; mandatory disclosure about activities relating to offshoring, such as lay-offs and 
outsourcing production; and economic sanctions such as elimination of state assistance to 
businesses that have laid off American employees and shifted jobs to a foreign country (Canto 
and van Gorp, 2007; Gupta and Sao, 2009; Manley and Hobby, 2006; Mordecai, 2005). Other 
legislative attempts are indirect but perhaps more potent. These include bills surrounding data 
privacy, labor negotiations, protection of intellectual property, bureaucratic preconditions on 
offshore contracts, and visa policies aimed at either restricting the number of foreign workers or 
increasing the costs of obtaining work visas (Canto and van Gorp, 2007; Gupta and Sao, 2009). 
Notable among such legislative attempts was the 2005-2006 proposal at the Federal level, by the 
then Senator Hillary Clinton of New York, termed the “Safeguarding Americans from Exporting 
Identification Data Act' or `SAFE-ID Act'.”  The proposed law sought to bar the transmission of 
any personally identifiable information of a U.S. citizen to any entity in a foreign country unless 
a set of standards was first met, including allowing consumers to prevent the transmission of 
such information.  
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The National Foundation of American Policy claims that between 2003 and 2007 alone 
upwards of 400 bills attempted to curb offshoring in one way or another of which only 12 
became law
9
.  For example, year 2004 legislation in Tennessee (Tennessee House Bill 2344) 
gives preference to data entry and call center operations vendors who ensure that the services are 
provided by U.S. citizens
10
. Another example is the 2005 legislation in New Jersey (New Jersey 
Senate Bill 494) which prohibits state contract work from being performed offshore
10
. 
The latest wave of anti-offshoring institutional pressures seems to coincide with the global 
economic crisis which began around 2008 and appears to be stronger than before. In 2008, the 
then presidential candidate Barack Obama stated while campaigning “I will stop giving tax 
breaks to companies that ship jobs overseas, and I will start giving them to companies that 
create good jobs right here in America.
11” In September 2010, with the unemployment rate in 
the United States hovering around 10% and the 111
th
 Congressional Session nearing its end, 
democrats lead by Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) introduced just such a bill titled, “S.3816 - 
Creating American Jobs and Ending Offshoring Act.” The proposed bill sought to amend the tax 
code in order to create American jobs and prevent the offshoring of such jobs. While the bill 
failed to become law, President Obama, officially criticized the opponents of this bill in White 
House press statements. In the weekly presidential address dated September 25, 2010 the 
president stated that “when we recently closed one of the most egregious loopholes for 
                                                 
9 National Foundation for American Policy available online at http://www.nfap.com/pdf/0407OutsourcingBrief.pdf 
(Retrieved, March 25, 2011). Foundation website: http://www.nfap.com 
10 State of Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research, Report # 2004-R-0647, September 14, 
2004 and 2004-R-0241, March 9, 2004. Available online at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/rpt/2004-R-0647.htm  and 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/rpt/2004-R-0241.htm   (retrieved on June 18, 2011). See, 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/olr/sitesearch.asp by searching for “outsourcing” for additional state level regulatory 
restrictions 
11 CIO Magazine: September 2, 2008, Patrick Thibodeau. Available online at: 
http://www.cio.com/article/447091/Obama_Speaks_Out_Against_Offshore_Outsourcing (Retrieved March 25, 
2011). 
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companies creating jobs overseas, Republicans in Congress were almost unanimously opposed. 
The Republican leader John Boehner attacked us for it, and stood up for outsourcing, instead of 
American workers.
12” The President also cited an overwhelming public opinion against 
outsourcing as evident from the “America Speaking Out” initiative by the Republican Party. 
Among other things, the initiative involved inviting citizens to suggest ideas for job creation on 
the “America Speaking Out” website13. Indeed, a post against “outsourcing of jobs from 
America” received the most interest and close to 5000 “thumbs up” votes. 
A border security bill was passed in July 2010 that had a provision for a steep increase in the 
visa fees for H1-b and L-1 visas. These increases in visa fees were estimated to add about $250 
million to the annual visa fee expenditures for the Indian IT industry
14
.  In the same month, the 
state of Ohio banned offshore work for government contracts. In the back drop of such changes, 
and the proposed introduction of the bill S.3816, the Indian offshoring industry began to show its 
concern. In September 2010, a high profile delegation led by the Indian industry group, National 
Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) and comprising senior 
representatives from Indian firms such as Wipro, Infosys, and TCS, visited Washington to voice 
its concern with law makers. Mr. Ameet Nivsarkar, NASSCOM Vice-President summarized the 
purpose of this visit: “It is a focused delegation. The idea is to make sure that we communicate 
                                                 
12 White House Weekly Address: September 25, 2010. Available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2010/09/25/weekly-address-president-obama-gop-leadership-standing-outsourcing-and-s (Retrieved March 
25, 2011). 
13 America Speaking Out Website: http://www.americaspeakingout.com/browse/questions/in/job-creation (Retrieved 
March 25, 2011) 
14 The Hindu – Business Line, September 14, 2010. Available online at: 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2010/09/15/stories/2010091552280700.htm (Retrieved, March 25, 2011). 
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our disappointment on the anti-outsourcing rhetoric, and also ensure that it does not become a 
trend in the US.
15
 ” 
In summary, regardless of the debate over whether such anti-offshoring institutional 
pressures are appropriate, necessary, or effective (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006), the above 
synopsis indicates that these pressures do exist. Thus, it is important to assess how characteristics 
of anti-offshoring pressures affect the strategic offshoring responses of offshoring client 
organizations. We review literature on offshoring next. 
3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
As mentioned in section 1, the purpose of this study is to examine the impact of both 
institutional and strategic considerations on the extent of organizational responsiveness to anti-
offshoring institutional pressures in the context of their IT and BP offshoring initiatives. Thus, it 
seems pertinent to understand the strategic drivers of offshoring, the benefits organizations 
derive from offshoring, and the challenges and risks faced in doing so. Similarly, it is important 
to assess the extent to which institutional explanations account for outsourcing related decisions 
and the extent to which strategic considerations and institutional aspects act in conjunction with 
each other. In the following sub-sections, we review the offshoring literature across these areas 
and conclude the literature review with a broad summary. 
3.1 Strategic Drivers of Offshoring  
Researchers have investigated a variety of factors that may predict and/or explain 
organizations’ offshoring decisions. Factors related to the internal motives of client firms and the 
                                                 
15 The Hindu – Business Line, September 14, 2010. Available online at: 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2010/09/15/stories/2010091552280700.htm (Retrieved, March 25, 2011). 
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nature of the transactions have been reported to play a role in the decision to offshore (Lacity et 
al., 2010; Lacity, Solomon, Yan, and Willcocks, 2011).  
In terms of the motivations to offshore, cost reduction is by far the most dominant driver 
reported in the literature (Lacity, Khan, and Willcocks, 2009). Both earlier studies (e.g., Clark, 
Jr., Zmud and McCray 1995; Lacity, Hirschheim and Willcocks 1994) and more recent ones 
(e.g., Fisher, Hirschheim and Jacobs 2008; Gonzalez, Gasco and Llopis 2005a; Lin, Lin and 
Huang 2007) have repeatedly shown that a client organization’s desire or need to reduce costs 
was a key driver for domestic outsourcing decisions (Blaskovich and Mintchik, 2011; Lacity et 
al., 2010). Similarly, cost reduction has been widely cited as the primary reason organizations are 
attracted to lower cost offshore destinations (e.g., Kaiser and Hawk, 2004; Khan and Fitzgerald, 
2004; King and Torkzadeh, 2008; Rao, Poole, Raven, and Lockwood, 2006; Sobol and Apte, 
1995).  
Other drivers for sourcing IT and BP related services through an offshore model include, 
access to expertise/skills of global suppliers, business or process performance improvements, 
enhancing service levels, warding off competitive pressures, improving flexibility and scalability, 
achieving faster delivery of IT and BP related services, and access to new markets in offshore 
destinations (e.g., Carmel and Tjia, 2005; Currie, Michell, and Abanishe, 2008; Hutzschenreuter, 
Lewin, and Dresel, 2011; Kaiser and Hawk, 2004; Rao et al., 2006; Sobol and Apte, 1995). 
Organizational motives to achieve scalable operations and improve time-for-delivery of services 
have been particularly more prominent in studies focusing on BP related decisions (Lacity et al., 
2011). 
Khan, Shaji, 2012, UMSL, p. 13 
 
 
In terms of attributes of the transactions, some have observed that potential increases in 
the transaction costs related to finding, evaluating, and managing offshore suppliers may 
discourage firms from offshoring (Smith and McKeen, 2004). Indeed, many studies report such 
increases in production and transaction costs as outcomes of offshoring (King and Torkzadeh, 
2008; Lacity and Rottman, 2008). Similarly, a potential increase in business risks (Smith and 
McKeen, 2004), concern for data security and protecting intellectual property (Gokhale, 2007; 
Sobol and Apte, 1995), and a relatively high degree of interdependence among tasks (Mirani, 
2007), have been reported to be negatively related to the decision to offshore. 
Further, based on insights from a focus group of senior IT managers representing a 
variety of companies across broad industry types, Smith and McKeen (2004) indicate that senior 
IT managers are typically cognizant of several risk factors associated with offshoring and often 
take these into account in making IT offshoring decisions. The senior IT managers in their focus 
group alluded to higher than expected transaction costs, reduced control on the delivery of IT 
services, legal and political uncertainties with respect to offshore destinations, cultural 
differences, and social justice issues. Smith and McKeen’s (2004) finding of ‘social justice’ 
related issues need particular elaboration given the study purposes. The authors mention that 
their focus group members “were very aware of the ‘optics’ of offshore outsourcing.” For 
example, one member stated that “public perceptions are important to us.”  
3.2 Success with Offshoring 
Having looked at the literature on offshoring decisions, it is important to also consider the 
literature which examines whether such organizations achieve the desired benefits (e.g. cost 
savings) from offshoring initiatives. Majority of empirical research on this issue focuses on 
explaining variation in the outcomes of offshoring as a function of a variety of factors. However, 
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relatively few studies directly describe the extent to which firms achieve the desired benefits. 
Nevertheless, a few sources do provide a clear indication of the organizational benefits of 
offshoring. These studies suggest that firms often accrue important cost and non-cost benefits 
from offshoring. Further, this literature suggests that offshoring has evolved beyond the 
traditional labor arbitrage paradigm and now includes strategic aspects such as innovation and 
global access to qualified talent (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009). 
The “Offshoring Research Network” (ORN) at Duke University’s Fuqua School of 
Business conducts a multi-year survey of a sample of firms regarding their outsourcing and 
offshoring initiatives. The survey covers of a variety of business processes including IT and 
software development. The 2004 survey was targeted to a sample of 650 U.S. Forbes 2000 
companies. Findings based on responses from 90 companies indicate that firms’ expectations 
from offshoring were either met or exceeded (Lewin and Peeters, 2006a). The reported median 
range of achieved cost savings across various types of offshore implementations were between 
30-40%. In addition, about 15% of offshore implementations led to cost savings of 50% or more. 
Similarly, in terms of operational service levels Lewin and Peeters (2006a p. 232) reported that 
74% of offshore implementations met service level expectations within the first 12 months of 
implementation. Overall, the authors suggested that strong positive performances were 
legitimizing the practice of offshoring across a wide variety of business processes, including IT, 
and predicted that the trend is expected to continue.  
Findings from the 2007-2008 Offshoring Research Survey pertaining to the outcomes of 
offshoring indicate that firms in general report a variety of benefits which go beyond cost-
savings. Further, the extent of benefits reported was generally higher for those firms which had a 
corporate-wide offshoring strategy than those which did not. For example, across the types of 
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functions offshored, 44% of the firms without a corporate offshoring strategy reported as having 
achieved ‘improved organizational flexibility’ where as 75% of the firms which had a corporate 
wide strategy reported achieving the same benefit. Other benefits at the company-level include 
increased productivity/efficiency, increase in firm’s overall competitiveness, better access to 
qualified personnel, better focus on core competencies, improved service quality, firm growth, 
and process improvements (Lewin, 2008). Further, and in contrast to reports from the 2004 
survey, the 2007-2008 survey reveals that firms achieved lower than expected cost savings but 
those with existing offshoring strategies fared better in this regard. For example, in terms of IT 
offshoring, firms without a functional offshoring strategy expected to the tune of 55% (median 
values) of savings but reported achieving about 30%. However, those firms with an overall 
offshoring strategy expected 40% and achieved 35%. Overall, firms obtained higher savings after 
having implemented corporate-wide offshoring strategies (Lewin, 2008). 
Tate, Ellram, Bals and Hartmann (2009) used a multi-theoretical lens to study the 
evolution of offshoring through a multiple-case study of 9 large Western organizations. In-depth 
interviews and archival data analyses indicated that in line with the primary motivation of cost-
reduction, firms did accrue cost related benefits. The study also indicates that as firms progressed 
in their offshore endeavors they also realized substantial non-cost benefits and began to 
anticipate such benefits in the future. Those firms which engaged in IT offshoring reported such 
varied benefits as gaining a foothold in a new geography, increased quality in products and 
services, access to educated employees, scalability improvements, flexibility, organizational 
learning, and improvements in business processes. Among these, access to qualified talent, 
quality, and process improvements were the most cited. For example, one respondent from an 
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Automotive company offshoring IT services “stated that its offshore provider is better at quality 
management and documentation than available onshore providers (Tate et al., 2009 pp. 517).” 
Based on a four-phase Delphi study comprising of 10 senior professionals with 
considerable experience in offshoring, Gokhale (2007) reports that executives believe that 
overall benefits from offshoring include cost savings, improvements in “time-to-market”, 
scalability in terms of labor, round the clock development work, and access to new technologies, 
tools, and techniques which an organization may not currently possess (Gokhale, 2007). The 
executives also demonstrated consensus in that it is essential to have quantifiable added value 
metrics to ultimately define success with an offshoring initiative (Gokhale, 2007).  
Bhalla, Sodhi, and Son (2008) attempted to assess if there is any link between the extent 
of offshoring and the performance (sales, profit as a percentage of sales, average annual sales per 
employee, and average annual profit per employee) of 144 of the Global Fortune 500 list of 
companies during the 5 year period from 1999 to 2004. Based on archival data from public 
announcements related to offshoring activities of the sample firms, the authors conclude that they 
could not find any direct or clear evidence between the extent of offshoring and firm 
performance. Their regression analyses did indicate that IT offshoring was positively related to 
average annual sales. The authors do not view their results as definitive indication of a lack of 
benefits from offshoring and suggest that future research may incorporate better measures of 
performance such as metrics at the business unit or department level (Bhalla et al., 2008). 
Indeed, it is quite possible that the performance indicators chosen in this study may be too distal 
from the benefits of offshoring.  
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Rottman and Lacity (2008) conducted 45 interviews and analyses of a large volume of 
documents at a major bio-tech firm in the United States which offshored 21 IT projects to six 
suppliers in India. The authors observe that juxtaposed against the promised benefits of offshore 
outsourcing such as lower IT costs, faster delivery speeds, and ability to focus on core 
capabilities, IT managers often struggle to realize full potential of offshoring. Rottman and 
Lacity (2008) found that while documents and reports by the senior management suggested that 
projects were consistently successful in delivering substantial cost savings, those intricately 
involved with the projects rated them poorly in terms of cost, quality, and productivity. For 
example, the head of the project management office observed that while the organization may 
have saved money on hourly labor costs, if other factors such as the extra effort in managing 
these projects and delayed delivery are taken into account, the organization may have actually 
lost money. The authors concluded that the firm’s strategy to replace domestic contractors with 
cheaper offshore suppliers was a poor fit with the firm’s social and cultural contexts and that the 
firm’s project management processes were incompatible with those of the offshore suppliers.  
Similar sentiments are echoed elsewhere. For example, in summarizing the findings of 
the studies submitted to the 2008 MIS Quarterly special issue on Information Systems 
Offshoring, King and Torkzadeh (2008) report that some studies found that rather than reducing 
costs, offshoring leads to increases in production and transaction costs. Also, while some studies 
reported a favorable stock market reaction to offshoring in general, others provide evidence 
suggesting that financial markets favor domestic outsourcing over offshoring when a firm’s 
motive is to improve process quality (King and Torkzadeh, 2008). 
Dibbern, Winkler and Heinzl’s (2008) study posed the question why is there so much 
variation in economic success between off-shored projects if the wage-differential, cited as the 
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primary offshoring motivation, is in fact so high. In particular they explored what types of “extra 
costs” do clients incur in offshore projects; and how/why do these extra costs for clients vary 
between projects. Defining client extra costs as “all costs in terms of time, effort, and resources 
spent by the client organization that go beyond the actual payments to the vendor (p. 335 
emphasis added),” Dibbern et al. (2008) drew on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory and 
the Resource Based View (RBV) in conducting a study of six offshored IT related projects to 
India. Their results indicated that the client faced extra costs in four types of activities involved 
in offshored projects: 1) requirements specification and design, 2) knowledge transfer, 3) control, 
and 4) coordination. Further, whenever projects required higher levels of client-specific 
knowledge, the incurred extra costs were substantially higher than when general knowledge was 
needed. Interestingly, the extra costs were primarily due to increased efforts in managing 
knowledge asymmetries between client and vendor and not due to the traditionally assumed logic 
(TCE based) of opportunistic behavior by vendors. They also found that a supplier’s prior 
experiences with related client projects reduced the level of extra costs but could not fully offset 
the increase in extra costs when the projects were highly client-specific. Finally, cultural and 
geographic distance between client and supplier increased a client’s extra costs. Cultural and 
geographic distance also interacted with level of required client-specific knowledge, such that 
the effect of client specific knowledge requirements on greater extra costs was even stronger 
when cultural and geographic distance was greater.  
In summary, there is a good indication that firms often accrue cost and non-cost benefits 
from offshoring. Both industry reports and academic research suggest that the benefits of 
offshoring are indeed important for organizations. However, while there are more than a few 
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instances of success stories related to offshoring, some empirical studies suggest that success is 
elusive and often contingent on a variety of factors.  
3.3 Challenges and Risks of Offshoring 
Parallel to these, are a collection of prescriptive and empirical studies which highlight the 
risk factors associated with offshoring. Appendix 2 summarizes some of the major challenges 
and risks related to domestic outsourcing, offshoring, and netsourcing. Domestic outsourcing and 
netsourcing are included to provide a frame of reference for ascertaining challenges and risks 
which are unique to offshoring.   
As detailed in Appendix 2, scholars attribute some risks to the clients and suggest that the 
onus lies on them to ensure success with sourcing arrangements. Examples include developing 
and retaining appropriate capabilities in-house, effectively managing suppliers, having realistic 
expectations of cost savings, and drafting and negotiating proper contracts (e.g., Bahli and 
Rivard, 2003; Earl, 1996). Other challenges and risks are supplier-specific and include lack of 
capabilities, financial viability, ability to attract and retain human capital (e.g., Jurison, 1995; 
Sullivan and Ngwenyama, 2005). Yet others are clearly endemic to market and hybrid sourcing 
arrangements – that is, those related to the transactions, relationships, and agency problems. 
These include hidden costs, supplier lock-in, difficulties in performance easurement/monitoring, 
opportunistic behavior, communication problems, and differences in organizational cultures 
(e.g., Bahli and Rivard, 2003; Earl, 1996; Iacovou and Nakatsu, 2008; Taylor, 2006).  
Appendix 2 also indicates that while the three sourcing initiatives share many similar 
challenges and risks, some are particular to offshoring. For example, the three factors related to 
socio-political risks, national culture differences, and negative impact on client image are 
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especially related to offshoring (e.g., Iacovou and Nakatsu, 2008; Kliem, 2004; Sakthivel, 2007). 
Similarly, some risks and challenges such as communication problems, data security, and 
intellectual property protection become more severe in the offshore context (Goodman and 
Ramer, 2007; Iacovou and Nakatsu, 2008). Further, factors such as communication problems and 
cultural differences may interact with other elements in the offshore context and can significantly 
erode the possible cost related benefits (Dibbern et al., 2008). 
3.4 Captive Offshoring 
The sections 3.1 to 3.3 primarily dealt with offshore outsourcing, i.e. engaging an offshore 
supplier for IT and BP work. Captive offshoring, on the other hand, refers to use of wholly 
owned and operated subsidiaries located in offshore locations that perform work for the parent 
company (Lewin and Peeters, 2006a; Oshri, Kotlarsky, Rottman, and Willcocks, 2009a). 
Research on captive offshoring is relatively limited as compared with offshore outsourcing 
(Oshri et al., 2009a; Oshri, Kotlarsky, and Willcocks, 2009b). Nevertheless, some work in this 
area addresses the extent of captive offshoring, reasons for engaging in captive arrangements, the 
different types of captive arrangements, and challenges in captive offshoring.  
Early research indicated that the extent of captive offshoring for IT related services was 
rather limited. For example, Lewin and Peeters (2006a) reported that 89% of IT related offshore 
implementations were [offshore] outsourced while only 11% were part of captive arrangements. 
This is compared to 69% percent of captive operations for finance and accounting business 
processes (Lewin and Peeters, 2006a). However, Carmel and Agarwal (2002) observe that 
captive IT offshoring was more likely to be done by IT firms. Four out of eight major IT firms in 
their study had extensive captive offshoring operations ranging from 400 to 2000 professionals 
working in offshore captive centers (Carmel and Agarwal, 2002). Based on interviews with 
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senior executives, the authors summarized the reasons these firms engaged in captive 
arrangements as resembling the classic “build versus buy” arguments. The firms preferred 
“having vertical integration and an internal locus of control (Carmel and Agarwal, 2002 p. 72).” 
Specific reasons identified by respondents include faster ramp-up times, advantages in terms of 
security and intellectual property protection, and compatibility with internal software 
engineering methodologies and work processes. The authors add that the technology companies 
also wanted to maintain strong in-house technical capabilities (Carmel and Agarwal, 2002).  
From a broader perspective, Oshri et al. (2009a) report that there are two primary reasons 
for investing in a captive subsidiary offshore. One is to reduce costs (relative to domestic 
operation) and the other to seek penetration in growth areas. Other reasons include access to 
qualified personnel (Oshri et al., 2009b). Correspondingly, firms may pursue different types of 
captive arrangements or strategies that go beyond the basic captive center model where the 
parent company wholly owns the captive operations and the captive center provides services 
only to the parent firm.  
Oshri et al. (2009b) identify three such broad strategies: hybrid, shared, and divested. 
Hybrid strategy entails the captive center providing services to the parent firm but in so doing it 
may further outsource (to local vendors in the offshore destination) traditionally non-core 
activities. The benefits include higher value work for the parent company while at the same time 
helping reduce overall costs. Shared strategy means that the captive center provides services to 
the parent firm but also seeks external clients. The rationale behind such arrangements is that the 
captive center becomes a profit center while at the same time reducing the overall unit costs by 
increasing the volume of work performed by the center. Divestment strategy may be adopted 
when the captive center has developed large scale operations which have brought the costs down 
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to the scale of offshore vendors. In such a scenario, the parent company assesses divestment 
when it is assured that the captive center will continue to provide services and the service levels 
will not be negatively affected. In addition to these three broad strategies, captive centers may 
take on other arrangements. These include “build-operate-transfer” (BOT) models where 
offshore suppliers initially setup and run a captive center only to later transfer it to a client based 
on certain terms and conditions. Joint-ventures are also possible but typically carry the BOT 
arrangement (Oshri and Corbett, 2011; Oshri et al., 2009a; Oshri et al., 2009b).  
Overall, firms engage in captive offshoring arrangements primarily to maintain internal 
control, protect intellectual property, reduce the exposure of core competencies to third-party 
suppliers, access qualified personnel, and increase access to new markets (Carmel and Tjia, 
2005; Kotlarsky and Oshri, 2008). At the same time, firms have been reported to face significant 
challenges of increasing costs, high levels of employee attrition, and lack of integration with the 
firm’s overall global strategy (Oshri et al., 2009b). 
3.5 Institutional Explanations of Outsourcing and Offshoring decisions 
The institutional perspective in a broad sense deals with the processes that define and 
explain institutionalization in organizational environments and the influences of such processes 
on organizations (DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Oliver, 1991; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). There are several variants of institutional theory 
which differ in their approaches and focuses (Scott, 1987). The approach most commonly 
studied in the IS literature deals with the impacts of the institutional context on organizations 
(Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). The premise of this approach holds that organizational actions are 
the product of ideas, beliefs, and values that originate in the institutional context (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). Meyer and Rowan (1977 p. 340) 
Khan, Shaji, 2012, UMSL, p. 23 
 
 
observe that “organizations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by 
prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work and institutionalized society. 
Organizations that do so increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of 
the immediate efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures.” 
Prominent among this approach is work on Institutional Isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) which seeks to explain and predict homogeneity in organizational forms and 
practices within a given organizational field. The term isomorphism captures the process of 
homogenization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three 
mechanisms though which institutional isomorphic change occurs: 1) coercive isomorphism, 2) 
mimetic isomorphism, and 3) normative isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism stems from formal 
and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are 
dependent and through the cultural expectations in the society within which organizations 
function. Mimetic isomorphism is when organizations model themselves on other organizations. 
This results from uncertainty which acts as a powerful force driving imitation when 
organizational technologies are poorly understood, goals are ambiguous, or when the 
environment creates symbolic uncertainty (DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Normative isomorphism is said to be primarily a product of 
professionalization in terms of formal education and professional networks.  
As mentioned earlier, IS literature primarily draws on work which explicates the 
institutional effects on organizational processes and structures and particularly the isomorphic 
pressures which bring about such changes (Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). Scholars have addressed 
varied aspects such as IT innovation, IS development and implementation, and IT adoption and 
use (Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). In this section, we discuss the Outsourcing literature which 
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either explicitly invokes such aspects of institutional theory or utilizes it to provide post-hoc 
explanations of outsourcing decisions. We include institutional explanations of broader 
outsourcing decisions as opposed to only offshoring decisions as literature on institutional 
explanations for offshoring, in particular, is rather sparse. 
Conceptualizing outsourcing as an “administrative innovation,” Loh and Venkatraman 
(1992) analyzed 60 IT outsourcing contracts reported in the press between the period 1988 and 
1990. Testing competing diffusion models pertaining to the influence sources responsible for 
diffusion of IT outsourcing, they found that outsourcing behavior of other organizations (what 
Loh and Venkatraman termed ‘internal sources of influence’) was a better explanatory 
mechanism of the diffusion pattern of IT outsourcing than the influences from mass media 
reports and vendor communications (i.e. ‘external-influences’). Further, they found strong 
evidence that mimetic influences dominated the diffusion patterns in the post-Kodak regime of 
their sample. That is, following the landmark announcement of Kodak to outsource, firms clearly 
displayed imitative behavior in outsourcing. Loh and Venkatraman (1992) discussed this so 
called “Kodak-effect” as being consistent with the “social visibility” related arguments of  
Mahajan et al. (1988) and with the ideas of institutional isomorphism presented by DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983).  
Hu, Saunders, and Gebelt (1997) replicated the Loh and Venkatraman (1992) study with a 
broader archival data set of 175 firms which outsourced IS functions during 1985 to 1995. 
However, they found no evidence of the “Kodak-effect” but reported that mixed-influence (i.e. 
both internal and external influences sources) is a dominant influence factor in the IT 
outsourcing diffusion process (Hu et al., 1997). Regardless of the difference in findings, both 
studies indicate that institutional influences from peer organizations, media reports, and supplier 
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communications played a role in organizations engaging in outsourcing. Loh and Venkatraman 
(1992) and Hu et al. (1997) do not indicate whether outsourcing in their samples involved 
offshore outsourcing.  
Miranda and Kim (2006) reported that their study departed from prior outsourcing studies 
adopting an institutional perspective in that they considered institutional structures emanating 
from within the organization as opposed to the traditional focus on external structures and their 
influence on organizations. Their focus was to understand whether professional or political 
contexts (in a surveyed sample of 214 city governments) fostered differential application of the 
Transaction Cost Economics logic to outsourcing decisions. The authors hypothesized that those 
city governments which operate in a professional logic will follow Transaction Cost Economics’ 
core prescriptions and those operating under a political logic will follow the opposite. That is, 
differences between the professional and political institutional contexts will lead to different 
paradigms of outsourcing related decisions. The authors found mixed support for their model. 
The institutional context moderated the TCE variables of opportunism, transaction frequency, 
and bounded rationality. However, the effects of core TCE variables such as asset specificity and 
uncertainty remained unaltered by the institutional logic being followed. The authors attributed 
their results, which were both counter to TCE and to their hypothesized moderating impact of the 
institutional context, to resource munificence and other characteristics of their sample of city 
government organizations. Miranda and Kim’s (2006) study did not indicate whether the 
outsourcing budgets (their dependent variable) of city governments included offshore 
outsourcing.  
Jayatilaka and Hirschheim (2009) conducted an interpretive field study of the influences 
of institutional processes and IT-driven considerations on the changes in organizations’ IT 
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sourcing arrangements overtime. The authors found that changes in sourcing arrangements they 
observed were often exclusively associated with either an institutional orientation or an IT-
driven orientation but rarely both. The authors drew on DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) coercive, 
mimetic and normative pressures of isomorphic change to understand institutional influences. On 
the other hand, they viewed IT-driven considerations as non-cost aspects such as systems 
development efficiency, technology access, productivity, business support from IT, and IT 
effectiveness (p. 98). In terms of the sourcing outcomes (satisfaction with IT sourcing 
arrangements) the authors contend that satisfaction depended more on what orientation 
(institutional versus IT-driven) firms had than on the actual IT sourcing arrangements 
themselves. Further, an institutional orientation is likely to lead to a less satisfactory sourcing 
arrangement than an IT-driven orientation – although just having an IT-driven orientation on its 
own may not be sufficient (Jayatilaka and Hirschheim, 2009 p. 101).  
Ang and Cummings (1997) was the only study which directly questioned the then 
prevalent view that organizations are passive players in light of institutional influences. Taking 
institutional influences from peer banks and federal regulators for information systems 
outsourcing within banks as their study context, the authors contended that despite strong 
institutional influences for outsourcing, banks may enact different strategic responses to such 
pressures. Specifically, they studied economic factors such as perceived economic gain from 
conformity to institutional pressures, financial capacity to resist institutional pressures, and 
transaction costs implied by conformity as moderators of the relationships between institutional 
influences and banks’ extent of IT outsourcing. They further hypothesized that the size of a bank 
will affect each of the interactions between institutional influence and the above mentioned 
moderators (i.e. three way interactions). Their study was restricted to the banking industry and 
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employed survey data from 243 banks in the United States. Given their dependent variable was 
dichotomous (outsourcing or insourcing) the authors employed a series of hierarchical moderated 
logistic regression analyses to test separate models related to each of their two-way and three-
way interaction hypotheses. Their results overwhelmingly indicate that when institutional 
influences involved potential regulatory sanctions, banks were mostly likely to comply with 
pressures to outsource. Further, this pattern was almost similar for both large and small banks. 
Ang and Cumming’s (1997) finding is consistent with Oliver’s (1991) assertion that 
acquiescence to institutional pressures best serves the organization’s interests when legal 
coercion is high and/or when it is strictly enforced. With respect to influences from peer banks, 
Ang and Cummings (1997) found that banks responded to internal considerations more than to 
institutional pressures from peers. In addition, larger banks tended to pay more attention to 
economic contingencies than smaller banks when institutional influences from peers were 
considered. Overall, while Ang and Cummings (1997) acknowledge Oliver’s (1991) ideas of a 
range of possible strategic responses by organizations, they only consider whether organizations 
outsource (acquiesce) or insource (defy). Further, given their study was restricted to the banking 
industry, it is unclear how variation in regulatory pressures, for example, when institutional 
enforcement, vigilance, and sanctions for noncompliance vary or are more moderate (Oliver, 
1991); may have changed the results reported in this study. Ang and Cummings (1997) also do 
not indicate whether outsourcing in their sample of banks involved offshore outsourcing.  
3.6 Literature Summary 
Overall, the literature suggests that while labor costs savings remains the primary strategic 
driver of offshoring, a variety of other strategic considerations have evolved. These range from 
access to qualified personnel to core activities such as innovation (Lewin et al., 2009; Willcocks 
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et al., 2010). The review also indicates that there are a range of benefits from offshoring (e.g., 
Lewin and Peeters, 2006a; Lewin and Peeters, 2006b; Tate et al., 2009) but there is substantial 
variation in the outcomes of offshoring in terms of the benefits derived by client firms (e.g., King 
and Torkzadeh, 2008; Lacity and Rottman, 2008) and that firms often have to contend with 
significant challenges and risks. 
Noticeably absent from the literature is an explicit consideration of the broader 
institutional environment in relation to either the drivers or consequences of offshoring, 
especially when institutional processes against offshoring are concerned. Although the broader 
Information Systems (IS) literature in general and IT outsourcing literature in particular has 
drawn on institutional theory (e.g., Hu et al., 1997; Loh and Venkatraman, 1992), a majority of 
prior work has tended to exclusively focus on explaining processes of conformity and 
isomorphism. See Mignerat and Rivard (2009) for a broader critique of institutional research in 
IS. While such work is immensely valuable, it downplays the roles of organizations’ concerns 
with respect to their task environments and active agency in their adaptation to the institutional 
environments (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Perrow, 1985). 
This research attempts to address this gap by studying the impact of the nature of anti-
offshoring institutional pressures on organizational responsiveness. Further, it explicitly 
considers internal and strategic considerations of organizations to account for organizational 
active agency and strategic adaptation in light of institutional expectations. We next discuss the 
theoretical framework. 
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4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Oliver’s (1991) theoretical framework integrates institutional and resource dependence 
theories to demonstrate how organizations’ strategic responses may vary from passive 
conformity to active resistance in response to institutional pressures. The level of responsiveness 
in turn depends on a set of factors related to the nature and context of the institutional pressures 
themselves (Oliver, 1991). The framework addressed a criticism of the institutional perspective 
that it tended to downplay the role of organizational self-interests and active agency in 
organizational adaptation and responses to institutional pressures and expectations (Covaleski 
and Dirsmith, 1988; DiMaggio, 1988; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1987). For example, 
Scott (1987; 1991) argued that just as is the case with an organization’s technical or task 
environments, an organization may be expected to exercise ‘strategic choice’(Child, 1972)  in 
relation to its institutional environments and when responding to institutional pressures (Scott, 
1991). Oliver suggested that institutional theory can and should accommodate interest-seeking, 
active behavior of organizations and this is possible if “organizations’ responses to institutional 
pressures and expectations are not assumed to be invariably passive and conforming across all 
institutional conditions (1991, p. 146).” Building on this argument, Oliver (1991) identified a 
continuum of strategic responses to institutional pressures. She theorized that, depending on a 
number of factors, such as the degree to which institutional pressures constrain organizational 
discretion and the dependence of organizations on institutional constituents,  organizations may 
respond to institutional pressures in a variety of modes ranging from passive compliance with – 
to – active defiance of institutional pressures (Goodstein, 1994). 
Oliver (1991) suggests that the predictive dimensions related to this conformity or resistance 
surround both the willingness and the ability of organizations to conform to institutional 
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pressures. These dimensions take into account the nature of the institutional pressures and 
considerations of the organizational task environments (Goodstein, 1994). Oliver (1991) 
describes the characteristics of these institutional determinants of strategic responses in terms of 
five factors: cause, constituents, content, control, and context.  
The cause of the institutional pressures refers to the underlying rationale for such pressures. 
It is the set of expectations or intended objectives that lead institutional stakeholders such as the 
state, to exert pressures on organizations. These reasons for external pressures may be oriented 
toward 1) enhancing an organization’s legitimacy or social fitness (for example, pressures on 
organizations to ‘go green’); or 2) improving its efficiency or economic fitness (for example, 
exhorting not-for-profit organizations to be more ‘business like’). To the extent an organization 
perceives that institutional demands can enhance its legitimacy or economic fitness, it is more 
likely to be responsive and less likely to resist institutional pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Oliver, 1991). 
Aspects related to the institutional constituents (including the state, professions, political 
and special interest groups, and the general public, among others) themselves may also impact 
the level of organizational resistance to institutional pressures. These aspects include 1) the 
degree of multiplicity of constituent expectations and 2) the dependence of organizations on 
external constituents. To the extent that the institutional field is fragmented as a result of 
divergence or multiplicity in constituents’ expectations, full compliance with institutional 
pressures will be difficult and resistance more feasible (Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010; 
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Resistance to institutional pressures is also more likely when 
organizational dependence on external actors is limited or when the external constituents have 
lower perceived power (resource derived or normatively sanctioned). The greater the extent to 
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which institutional constituents control resources or exert power the more difficult it will be for 
organizations to resist their expectations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). 
Two dimensions related to the content of the pressures themselves also predict the degree of 
resistance: 1) The degree to which institutional pressures conflict with organizational goals, and 
2) the extent to which the institutional pressures constrain organizational discretion. 
Organizations are less likely to resist to the extent that institutional expectations are compatible 
or consistent with internal organizational goals and plans. Similarly, resistance is more likely if 
compliance with institutional expectations means a loss of autonomy in terms of managerial 
discretion (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990) and internal control over processes and outputs 
(Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
The nature of institutional control, that is, the means by which institutional pressures are 
exerted on organizations will also predict organizational response. Oliver (1991) identifies at 
least two distinct processes by which pressures are imposed: 1) legal coercion and 2) voluntary 
diffusion. When broader institutional expectations begin to get shaped into the force of law or 
government mandate, organizations are made more aware of the public interests (Oliver, 1991). 
To the extent that consequences of nonconformity are severe and the legal mandate is broadly 
applicable and enforced, compliance with institutional pressures is more likely (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). While regulatory mandates are imposed by means of authority, 
institutional pressures or expectations may also arise when the norms and expectations have been 
voluntarily adopted and diffused through an organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Goodstein, 1994; Scott, 1987). 
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Finally, at least two aspects of an organization’s environmental context, 1) environmental 
uncertainty and 2) the degree of interconnectedness, may also affect organizations’ conformity or 
resistance to institutional demands and expectations. When the environmental context of 
institutional influence is highly uncertain, organizations are more likely to comply with 
institutional pressures so as to reduce uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Similarly the extent to which the institutional environment is highly 
interconnected it facilitates widespread diffusion of institutional norms and demands and 
increases the likelihood of conformity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Oliver, 1991). 
In summary, Oliver’s (1991) framework identifies the five institutional factors of cause, 
constituents, content, control, and context and the 10 predictive dimensions (2 each) within 
them as determinants of the levels of organizational responsiveness to institutional pressures. 
Oliver (1991) suggested that depending on the study context, empirical applications of this 
framework may either predict the degree of responsiveness or focus on individual strategic 
responses (such as acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation). In line 
with prior studies (Julian, Ofori-Dankwa, and Justis, 2008; Milliken, Martins, and Morgan, 1998) 
we limit this model to predicting the degree of organizational responsiveness to institutional 
pressures and examine dimensions of the institutional factors which are most pertinent to this 
study’s context (e.g., Goodstein, 1994; Ingram and Simons, 1995).  
Using Oliver’s (1991) framework, prior research has examined pressures which required 
organizations to alter their processes or  outputs (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
These studies include explanations of organizational responses to broad institutional pressures 
for employer involvement in work-family issues (Goodstein, 1994; Ingram and Simons, 1995; 
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Milliken et al., 1998). Yet others have partly drawn on this theory in studying specific pressures 
from interest groups (i.e. a single institutional constituent group) attempting to influence the 
restaurant industry to reduce fat content in their food offerings (Julian et al., 2008). Overall, this 
framework is suitable for studying questions of the form “how do organizations strategically 
respond to institutional pressures and what factors affect organizational responses (Goodstein, 
1994p. 352).” Thus, this framework lends itself to the study of anti-offshoring institutional 
pressures which impact how organizations source information technology and business 
processes.  
In the next section, we develop hypotheses incorporating specific dimensions of the five 
institutional factors which predict organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional 
pressures.  
5 HYPOTHESES 
Incorporating Oliver’s (1991) theoretical framework discussed earlier, we posit that the level 
of organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures will depend on five 
factors pertaining to the nature of such pressures mapped across the respective predictive 
dimensions under cause, constituents, content, control, and context. These are 1) Social 
Legitimacy (cause), or organizational expectations that greater responsiveness will enhance an 
organization’s legitimacy or social fitness. 2) Dependence on Federal and State Governments 
(constituents), the degree to which organizations are dependent on pressuring constituents. 3) 
Organizational Plans for Offshore Portfolio (content), that is, an organization’s plans to increase, 
maintain, or decrease its offshore headcount. 4) Complying Actions of other Firms (control), that 
is, knowledge of focal executives that executives at other firms are lowering the extent of 
Khan, Shaji, 2012, UMSL, p. 34 
 
 
offshore engagements. 5) Regulatory Environment Uncertainty (context), the degree to which 
executives perceive the regulatory environment with respect to offshoring as unpredictable. In 
addition, we incorporate 6) Organizational Success with Offshoring as a key organizational 
consideration with respect to offshoring. Success with Offshoring is also posited to moderate the 
effects of all five institutional factors. The hypotheses outlined below specify these effects and 
Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships within the theoretical framework. 
FIGURE 1 
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Social Legitimacy and Organizational Responsiveness 
 As discernable from the analysis of institutional pressures against offshoring discussed 
earlier, underlying these pressures seems to be a set of normative beliefs based on the rationale 
that organizations should play a more active role in reducing the overall level of unemployment 
in the United States instead of exacerbating it by moving jobs offshore. Such a rationale and the 
ensuing pressures seem akin to requiring organizations to reduce pollution, deliver safe products 
and services, to promote health and safety of employees, or adopt work-family initiatives – all of 
which are geared toward making organizations more socially fit or acceptable (Goodstein, 1994; 
Ingram and Simons, 1995; Oliver, 1991). Oliver (1991) suggests that the choice between 
conformity and resistance to institutional pressures will depend on the degree to which the 
organization agrees with and values the intentions that institutional constituents are attempting to 
achieve in pressuring the organization to be more socially accountable. This line of reasoning is 
consistent with Suchman’s (1995) arguments that organizations conform to their environments to 
obtain either or both pragmatic or moral legitimacy and can be understood based on both a 
strategic view of instrumentally managing legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978) and the institutional view of obtaining legitimacy as the essence of conformity to 
institutional processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995).  
When an organization anticipates that conformity will enhance its social fitness (that is, it 
would be viewed as more socially responsible or accountable), acquiescence will be the most 
probable response to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). To the extent that organizational 
actors perceive that not engaging in offshoring or reducing the current extent of offshoring will 
help enhance the organization’s social legitimacy in the eyes of institutional and other 
stakeholders, it is more likely to conform to institutional pressures against offshoring. That is, if 
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an organization believes that it will be viewed as socially responsible and as “doing the right 
thing” by “not sending jobs overseas” it is likely to lean toward conformity. On the other hand 
when organizations are skeptical about the social legitimacy or strategic utility of conformity, 
they are more likely to resist (Oliver, 1991). Accordingly, we hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 1: The greater the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable from 
conformity to anti-offshoring institutional pressures, the greater the organizational 
responsiveness. 
Dependence on Governments and Organizational Responsiveness 
 The power-dependence relationships between an organization and critical institutional 
constituents also play an important role in organizational resistance to institutional pressures. 
Drawing on resource dependence theory, Oliver (1991) suggests that an organization will be less 
likely to resist external pressures when it is dependent on the sources of these pressures (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). Theorists have further observed that power accrues to those who control 
resources (Pfeffer, 1981), and that the possession of such power makes a stakeholder important 
to managers (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997). In the context of this study, one of the most 
important institutional stakeholders is the Government or specifically, Federal and relevant State 
Government(s). Government and government policies enacted through legislation have control 
over critical resources that shape firms’ competitive environments (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). As a 
result there is substantial interdependence between a firm’s economic or competitive 
environment and public policy (Baron, 1995). Further, government decision makers have the 
ability to alter the size and structure of markets, to affect the demand of products and services, 
and to alter the cost structure of firms through various types of legislation (Hillman and Hitt, 
1999).  Governments have power to channel valuable resources toward or away from a firm and 
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to use multiple “carrots and sticks” (e.g. tax, data privacy/security, and labor laws) to pressure 
firms (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006). 
 Further, as issues such as offshoring, progress through local to national public awareness 
with increased media exposure and interest group involvement, they eventually enter the 
legislative or regulatory arena (Greening and Gray, 1994; Mollitor, 1977). Legislative attempts, 
such as the S.3816 - Creating American Jobs and Ending Offshoring Act in United States Senate 
exemplify such eventual transition. The above bill was proposed with a specific aim to reduce or 
eliminate tax benefits to corporations that send jobs overseas and to increase tax benefits to those 
that create domestic jobs. The corporate political activity literature suggests that firms often take 
pulse of the regulatory climate with respect to issues that are salient to them in anticipation of 
public policy changes (Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004; Mollitor, 1977). 
 In sum, to the extent organizations are highly dependent on Federal or State Governments 
they are less like to resist demands for reduced offshoring or fulfillment of government contracts 
using local labor as opposed to offshore labor. On the other hand, when dependence on Federal 
or State Governments is low more resistant strategies represent minimal risks to organizational 
interests because the organization is no longer held captive by its dependence (Oliver, 1991). In 
such cases partial conformity or even avoidance in the form of ceremonial conformity will be 
more likely (Oliver, 1991). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the degree of organizational dependence on Federal and State 
Governments, the greater the organizational responsiveness. 
Organizational Plans for Offshore Portfolio and Organizational Responsiveness 
 Along with cause and aspects related to the constituents, the content of the institutional 
pressures is also relevant. One dimension of the content of pressures is the consistency or 
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congruence of institutional expectations with organizational goals and policies (Goodstein, 1994; 
Oliver, 1991). Organizations will be more responsive to institutional expectations when such 
expectations are compatible with internal goals and plans and less likely to be responsive when 
internal logics of production and technical considerations are at odds with institutional 
expectations. In such instances institutional expectations may be precluded by organizational 
goals and policies that give greater weight to technical and/or economic standards against which 
performance of most organizations is primarily assessed (Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991). Ingram 
and Simons (1995) showed that public sector organizations where more likely to be responsive 
than private sector organizations to institutional expectations regarding organizational 
involvement in work-family issues. The authors conclude that organizations with goals 
consistent with institutional pressure are more likely to respond (p. 1476).  
 Organizational plans with respect to offshoring may be shaped with respect to a variety of 
internal considerations.  For example, given the pervasiveness of IT and its operational and 
strategic impact, IT sourcing decisions are often substantive for organizations. In fact the 
common notion of IT Sourcing, as  “the organizational arrangement instituted for obtaining IS 
services and the management of resources and activities required for producing these services 
(Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim, and Bandula, 2004 p. 11), ” suggests that IT sourcing portfolios 
need to be carefully managed vis-à-vis the organization’s best interests. Further, as mentioned 
earlier, organizations may engage in offshoring for a variety of reasons such as for better 
managing costs (King and Torkzadeh 2008) to gain access to expertise/skills of global suppliers, 
for business or process performance improvements, and for access to new markets in offshore 
destinations (e.g., Carmel and Tjia 2005; Kaiser and Hawk 2004; Rao, Poole, Raven and 
Lockwood 2006; Sobol and Apte 1995). Similarly, organizations may choose to reduce or 
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eliminate offshore engagements simply because there is no more need (e.g., major projects have 
been completed), or because there are other technical and economic considerations such as lack 
of desired cost savings, problems with more than expected extra costs, high turnover in offshore 
locations, and problems associated with knowledge transfer, among others (Dibbern et al., 2008; 
Iacovou and Nakatsu, 2008; King and Torkzadeh, 2008; Ranganathan and Balaji, 2007). To the 
extent organizational plans with respect to offshoring are to increase its overall offshore portfolio 
based on its internal logic, such plans will be at odds with institutional expectations to reduce 
offshoring. On the other hand if organizational plans are to decrease its overall offshore portfolio 
then institutional expectations are in line with organizational goals—leading to greater 
responsiveness (cf., Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991). Thus, if an organization plans to increase its 
offshore portfolio it is less likely to be responsive to anti-offshoring institutional expectations. 
This suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Organizations that plan to increase their offshore portfolio will be less responsive 
to anti-offshoring pressures than organizations that plan to maintain or reduce their offshore 
portfolio.  
Complying Actions of Other Firms and Organizational Responsiveness 
Institutional control refers to the mechanisms through which pressures are imposed on 
organizations. Oliver (1991) discusses two such distinct processes: legal coercion and voluntary 
diffusion. In the absence of an overarching legal mandate prohibiting offshoring
16
, the extent, to 
which the phasing out or elimination of offshoring has voluntary been diffused in an 
organizational field may become the primary mechanism through which influence occurs (cf., 
Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991). As organizations adopt norms or practices they become models 
                                                 
16 There have been attempts at legislation to curb offshoring at both the federal and state levels in the United States. 
However, to our knowledge, there is yet to be a broadly applicable and potently enforced law which directly forbids 
offshoring. See the discussion on legislative attempts against offshoring in Section 2. 
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for other organizations in an organizational field, reduce uncertainty with a specific innovation, 
and the norms and practices they adopt become increasingly legitimated (Goodstein, 1994; 
Zucker, 1987). This line of reasoning is consistent with DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) view on 
the mimetic mechanisms underlying organizational conformity. Overall, the more broadly 
diffused an institutional expectation or practice has become, the greater the likelihood that 
organizations will conform. On the other hand, the less widespread a set of values, practices, or 
expectations, the more likely that organizations will be skeptical and the greater the likelihood 
that organizations will resist (Oliver, 1991). 
While the relevance of what is happening with respect to offshoring in an organization’s 
field is clear from the above, it is important to note that institutional pressures are often mediated 
by the organization’s immediate social structural context in terms of social network ties 
(Westpahl and Zajac, 2001). That is, in responding to external pressures, senior executives and 
managers are often influenced by information obtained from leaders of other firms in their 
network (cf., Westpahl and Zajac, 2001). In other words, for executives, a more nuanced 
indication of an impending drift away from offshoring, if any, may come from leaders of other 
firms in their social network. Prior research supports this line of reasoning. For example, Davis 
(1991) demonstrated how direct communication between managers across firms provided a 
mechanism of vicarious learning for focal firms with respect to the potential benefits and 
drawbacks of adopting “poison pills” as a takeover defense. Similarly, Westpahl and Zajac 
(2001) found that the likelihood of a focal firm decoupling stock buyback programs from actual 
practice increased when other firms in its network had also previously done so. 
 In sum, the extent to which the ideas of moving away from or further toward offshoring 
have diffused in an organizational field will determine an organization’s response to institutional 
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pressures against offshoring. However, the relationships of a focal firm’s executives with senior 
managers at other firms provide the mechanism for vicarious learning--they provide information 
about the extent to which such diffusion has occurred and the potential benefits/drawbacks of 
different responses. Thus, to the extent that executives from the focal firm believe that senior 
managers at other firms in their network are moving away from offshoring, the focal firm is 
likely to follow suit. This notion is in line with both a network embeddedness perspective 
(Granovetter, 1985; Westpahl and Zajac, 2001) and a mimetic processes view in which 
administrators under uncertainty regarding the appropriate response will draw on and heed to 
what others are doing (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Milliken, 1987). This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the extent to which senior managers at a focal firm believe that 
executives at other firms are curbing or eliminating offshoring, the greater the organizational 
responsiveness. 
Regulatory Environment Uncertainty and Organizational Responsiveness 
 Finally, Oliver’s (1991) framework maintains that the environmental context within 
which pressures are exerted on organizations is also likely to be a determinant of organizational 
responsiveness. Specifically, the regulatory environment uncertainty with respect to offshoring is 
predicted to affect the level of organizational responsiveness. Both resource dependence and 
institutional theorists have long argued that decision makers within organizations have strong 
preferences for certainty, stability, and predictability in organizational life (DiMaggio, 1988; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Zucker, 1987). Oliver (1991) suggests that when the environmental context of institutional 
influence is highly uncertain and unpredictable, an organization will exert greater effort to 
reestablish control and stability over future organizational outcomes. In such cases when 
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uncertainty is high, she predicts that organizations are less likely to actively resist and more 
likely to conform. However, as uncertainty diminishes, the need for stability, security and control 
decreases and organizations grow more confident in their predictions about future resource 
acquisition, legitimacy, and organizational outcomes (Oliver, 1991). 
 When top-level managers perceive a high level of uncertainty in terms of what actions 
constituents such as government regulatory bodies, might take (Milliken, 1987) they are more 
likely to err in favor of stability and control over their sourcing portfolio and eliminate or reduce 
the extent of offshoring. That is, managers are more likely to insulate the organization from 
unpredictable shifts in the environment and/or to diversify (their sourcing portfolio), by 
considering more domestic sourcing options vis-à-vis offshoring, so as to diminish the 
organization’s vulnerability to conditions which are poorly understood  (cf. Milliken, 1987). On 
the other hand, when perceived environmental uncertainty in terms of future regulatory action is 
low, managers are likely to view offshoring as less risky in terms of stability and control over 
their sourcing portfolio and more likely to resist institutional pressures against offshoring. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5: The lower the level of uncertainty in regulatory actions of Federal and State 
Government(s) with respect to offshoring, the lower the organizational responsiveness. 
Organizational Success with Offshoring and Organizational Responsiveness 
 Oliver’s (1991) framework explicitly adopts the assumption that organizational 
conformity to institutional pressures is a strategic choice and acknowledges the importance of 
both institutional and technical (i.e. task environment) determinants to this choice (Goodstein, 
1994). The implicit theoretical rationale underlying the level of responsiveness to institutional 
expectations surrounds both the willingness and ability of organizations to conform to the 
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institutional environment (Oliver 1991). In this sense, an organization’s task environment 
considerations and strategic imperatives become crucial ingredients in how organizations 
respond to institutional expectations strategically. Prior research has contributed to this line of 
theorizing in at least two different ways. First, for example, Goodstein (1994) incorporated the 
technical-economic considerations in an explicit fashion along with Oliver’s (1991) five 
institutional factors, in predicting organizational responses. Specifically, he demonstrated that to 
the extent institutional expectations were strong and the organizational actors perceived that the 
benefits of compliance outweighed the costs of compliance; acquiescence was the most likely 
response. Second, researchers have attempted to explicitly include managerial cognition into the 
mix by suggesting that variance in organizational compliance maybe in part due to the 
differences in managers’ level of attention to issues and how they interpret such issues vis-à-vis 
their organization’s technical/economic and strategic considerations (Julian et al., 2008; Milliken 
et al., 1998).  
 Both streams depict some aspects of the role of active agency which institutional theorists 
had opined for  (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991), as it 
comes into play when organizations consider the responses to institutional pressures. However, 
both are silent on how active agency surfaces with respect to the strategic drivers and outcomes 
of the very organizational actions which are the subject of institutional pressures to begin with. 
To elaborate, managers often have certain strategic objectives in mind that they translate into 
certain decisions and actions geared toward attainment of such objectives (e.g., Hutzschereuter, 
Pedersen, and Volberda, 2007; Lewin et al., 2009). It is unclear, then, how active agency 
manifests itself when 1) the very actions toward attainment of certain strategic goals become the 
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subject of counter institutional pressures, and 2) there is variation in the outcomes of such 
strategic actions which may have implications for the organization itself. 
 Offshoring provides a fertile context for the evaluation of such aspects of the internal 
considerations of organizations in responding to institutional expectations. As discussed in the 
literature review section, the most dominant strategic driver of offshoring reported in the 
literature is to realize cost savings through labor arbitrage  (e.g., Kaiser and Hawk, 2004; Khan 
and Fitzgerald, 2004; King and Torkzadeh, 2008; Rao et al., 2006; Sobol and Apte, 1995). 
However, studies increasingly report other strategic motives such as access to skilled personnel 
offshore, attaining business or process performance improvements, and access to new markets as 
part of a larger global strategy, lead firms to offshoring (e.g., Carmel and Tjia, 2005; Kaiser and 
Hawk, 2004; Rao et al., 2006; Sobol and Apte, 1995). For example, based on the ORN 
longitudinal survey, Arie Lewin and his colleagues report that offshoring practices have evolved 
at a dramatic pace. By 2008 offshoring had become a major strategic concern of top management 
at many companies and many existing and planned offshore implementations dealt with 
innovation related activities such as research and development, new product and software 
development, and knowledge-intensive processes (Lewin et al., 2009). While these strategic 
motives may be driving companies to offshore, scholars have also reported substantial variation 
in the outcomes of such strategic endeavors (Dibbern et al., 2008; Lewin et al., 2009; Lewin and 
Peeters, 2006b; Manning, Massini, and Lewin, 2008; Rottman and Lacity, 2008). It is this 
variation in outcomes of past offshoring efforts with respect to various strategic motives is what 
we suggest will also play a role in organization’s strategic responses to institutional pressures. 
This is both in addition to and in conjunction with the five institutional factors described earlier. 
Specifically, we contend that past success with offshoring will both have a direct effect on 
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organizational responsiveness to institutional pressures against offshoring and also moderate the 
effects of the five institutional factors. We specify the related hypotheses next. 
 As noted earlier, a variety of firm level and environmental conditions have reportedly 
driven firms to consider offshoring. Prominent among these are lower costs, faster delivery 
speeds, ability to refocus on core business, increasing access to qualified personnel, accessing 
suppliers’ technical capabilities, and achieving process improvements (e.g., Carmel and 
Agarwal, 2002; Carmel and Tjia, 2005; Lacity and Rottman, 2008; Rottman and Lacity, 2008). 
Managers have long been required to contain costs, ramp up projects quickly, find qualified and 
experienced personnel in fast moving technologies, and to innovate constantly (Carmel and 
Agarwal, 2002). Such requirements seemed to have intensified over-time. For example, a recent 
Gartner Inc. report
17
 suggests that CIOs are unlikely to see any increases in IT budgets but will 
be expected to do more than ever before – keep IT costs low while more rapidly respond to 
business changes, regulatory compliance and innovation. IT will be forced “to make the business 
of the past more productive, while IT must invest in the future at a rate that does not grow IT 
costs faster than the business (p. 13).” Similarly, scholars indicate that offshoring may be a key 
way forward in the global race for talent and innovation (Lewin et al., 2009).  
However, many firms fail to realize the desired benefits from offshoring (Ranganathan 
and Balaji, 2007). Scholars indicate that it takes a tremendous amount of detailed management 
on both the client and supplier sides to realize the expected benefits of offshore outsourcing 
(Rottman and Lacity, 2006). Having the appropriate capabilities, strong relationship management 
and investments, a corporate wide strategy for offshoring, learning curve effects, and dynamic 
                                                 
17 Lopez, J. and Raskino, M. -- Gartner Inc. (March 4, 2010), “CEO Concerns: Peering into 2010 and Beyond” ID: 
G00174004 
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portfolios of control may all be attributed to success with offshoring (Carmel and Tjia, 2005; 
Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Lacity et al., 2010; Lacity and Rottman, 2008; Manning et al., 
2008; Rottman and Lacity, 2008). 
 Thus, to the extent the strategic drivers of offshoring remain relevant for firms and 
managers believe that they have been successful in achieving the strategic benefits through their 
current offshoring efforts (while avoiding or mitigating some of the challenges of offshoring) 
they are more likely to continue offshoring. As a result they are also less likely to be responsive 
to anti-offshoring institutional pressures. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: The greater the level of organizational success with offshoring, the lower the 
organizational responsiveness. 
In addition to this direct effect, we expect that the level of organizational success with 
offshoring will strengthen the effects of those institutional factors which lower responsiveness 
and at the same time weaken the effects of those factors which increase organizational 
responsiveness. Institutional theorists have acknowledged that to the extent conformity to 
institutional pressures is perceived to conflict with organizational goals and economic interests, 
organizations will be more likely to resist such pressures (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; 
Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Such inconsistency reflects 
organizational interests and strategic motives to be at odds with institutional expectations and 
provokes organizational doubts about the validity or legitimacy of institutional expectations 
(Oliver, 1991). That is, the likelihood that organizations will conform or resist to institutional 
pressures is not exclusively dependent on the five institutional factors identified above 
(Hypotheses 1 – 5) but also in interaction with the discrepancy between institutional expectations 
and organizational strategic motives. We extend these arguments to not only include the strategic 
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motives but more proximally, the outcomes of the actions geared toward achievement of such 
strategic goals. In other words, beyond the strategic drivers of offshoring initiatives (the subject 
of counter institutional pressures), it is the outcomes of current offshoring efforts in terms of the 
strategic objectives that will further determine the level of responsiveness to institutional 
pressures. Given the significant challenges with offshoring (e.g., Carmel and Tjia, 2005; 
Rottman and Lacity, 2006) those firms which did achieve some level of success with offshoring 
will be less responsive despite the institutional pressures against offshoring. These considerations 
lead to the following 5 moderation hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 7a: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the relationship 
between the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable from conformity to anti-
offshoring institutional pressures and organizational responsiveness: the relationship is less 
positive for those who report high, as opposed to low, success with offshoring. 
Hypothesis 7b: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the relationship 
between the degree of dependence on Federal and State Governments and organizational 
responsiveness: the relationship is less positive for those who report high, as opposed to low, 
success with offshoring. 
Hypothesis 7c: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the relationship 
between organizational plans for offshore portfolio and organizational responsiveness: the 
relationship is more negative for those who report high, as opposed to low, success with 
offshoring.  
Hypothesis 7d: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the relationship 
between the extent to which senior managers at a focal firm believe that executives at other firms 
are curbing or eliminating offshoring and organizational responsiveness: the relationship is less 
positive for those who report high, as opposed to low, success with offshoring. 
Hypothesis 7e: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the relationship 
between level of uncertainty in regulatory actions of Federal and State Government(s) with 
respect to offshoring and organizational responsiveness: the relationship is less positive for 
those who report high, as opposed to low, success with offshoring. 
 
Khan, Shaji, 2012, UMSL, p. 48 
 
 
6 METHOD 
6.1 Data Collection Approach and Target Respondents 
A web-based questionnaire survey served as the primary data collection method. The 
following factors guided this choice. First, Oliver (1991) suggests that research strategies to 
investigate responsiveness need to include perceptual measures of several of the proposed 
variables and that field interviews or questionnaires may be used (p. 172). Second, to our 
knowledge, there is currently no publicly available (or even available for purchase) archival data 
pertaining to the study variables. Organizations are currently not required to disclose their extent 
of offshore engagements and/or the reasons behind their plans to increase/decrease their 
offshoring initiatives. Given these considerations, we chose the questionnaire survey approach. 
Prior research has argued and shown that macro-organizational aspects, such as the focus of this 
study, are relatively less susceptible to mono-method biases compared to more micro-
organizational concepts such as job satisfaction, stress, and turnover intentions (Ang and 
Cummings 1997; Crampton and Wagner 1994). Further, scholars have suggested that in the 
absence of archival data, self-reported measures are acceptable at the organizational unit of 
analysis provided data is obtained from key respondents who are directly involved with and 
knowledgeable about the subject matter of interest (Chan, Huff, Copeland, and Barclay, 1997; 
Dess and Robinson, 1984; Peng and Luo, 2000; Sabherwal and King, 1995). 
 Target respondents: As indicated above, target respondents for the questionnaire were 
senior executives (King and Sabherwal, 1992) knowledgeable about the sourcing activities at 
each firm. However, accurate identification of individuals with such knowledge across a random 
sample of organizations proved to be challenge. For example, a recent IT sourcing related report 
from Gartner Research (Karamouzis, 2011) indicates that the constituents more typically 
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responsible for the planning and execution of all IT sourcing initiatives within an organization 
include the CIO or those operational managers who directly report to the CIO or other senior 
executives in charge of IT. Further, executives within other functions such as procurement (e.g., 
Chief Procurement Officer), legal, and in some cases respective business units are also often in 
charge of sourcing. 
To overcome this challenge of identifying executives knowledgeable of sourcing and in 
light of difficulties in obtaining data from busy executives we drew on a unique resource that 
directly provided us access to sourcing executives and professionals. Specifically, to find and 
gain access to such individuals, we sought help from the research wing of Everest Group, a 
reputable and fairly large advisory firm with offices in the United States, Canada, United 
Kingdom, and India. Among Everest Group’s many service offerings, the firm provides research 
and consulting services to buyers and providers of outsourced services and has a significant 
focus on offshore or global sourcing. Its clients include Global 1000 firms from around the world 
and across all industry categories
18
.  The Managing Partner for Research was our point of contact 
and championed our research efforts and access to Everest Group’s database of sourcing 
executives. 
The research firm’s database comprised of names and email addresses of over 10,000 
subscribers who draw on this firm’s active industry research output and a variety of webinar 
style presentations related to global sourcing of business services. The research firm agreed to 
help us collect data from these subscribers. The subscribers represented mostly large 
organizations from across the world currently engaged in substantial offshore arrangements both 
                                                 
18 Everest Group Website, About Us section: available online at http://www.everestgrp.com/about-us/. Accessed on 
February 24, 2012. 
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via captive and third-party supplier models. The subscribers were at various levels within these 
organizations, ranging from C-level executives to project managers. This was an ideal pool of 
potential respondents for study purposes, access to which was otherwise very difficult. Thus, we 
capitalized on this excellent resource and sought to target the subscribers in Everest Group’s 
mailing list. We did so while fully realizing the tradeoff of not having a traditional random 
sample of organizations.  
6.2 Instrument Refinement and Data Collection 
Instrument refinement: We took the following steps to ensure that the measures were 
reliable and valid during the design stage (steps carried out in the analysis stage are outlined 
below). First, we drew on established measures with demonstrated reliability and validity when 
possible. Second, the instrument was reviewed by two dissertation committee members with 
knowledge of broader offshoring research and practice. Each member was requested to carry an 
in-depth assessment of the measures given the study purposes. They were requested to 
specifically review the initial draft instrument to identify questions that are ambiguous, vague, or 
sources of possible bias (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). We iteratively incorporated any 
suggested changes and refinements. The changes pertained to re-wording of certain items, 
shortening of items, and elimination of redundant items to shorten the overall survey length. 
Third, we pre-tested the refined instrument with three executives. Two of these were former 
senior level IT executives at large organizations in the aerospace and financial services 
industries. The third executive had extensive experience with global sourcing throughout his 
career and is currently considered a leading outsourcing expert/consultant. We asked the 
executives to read the questionnaire carefully and to assess meaningfulness, relevance, and 
clarity of its items (King and Sabherwal, 1992). Again, changes were incorporated iteratively 
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(Chan et al., 1997). The changes from executives pertained to wording changes in the 
instructions page of questionnaire and clarification/shortening of instructions for certain 
questions. 
Fourth, representatives of the Everest Group went through the survey draft and suggested 
many changes to better fit the industry vernacular and the current offshoring environment. The 
managing partner of research, one vice-president of research, and two research analysts, 
carefully read the survey multiple times. We incorporated their suggestions related to survey 
length and wording for survey and question instructions iteratively. The survey length was 
reduced by approximately 40%. All these pre-test respondents reported a survey completion time 
between 15 to 20 minutes.  
Survey administration: The refined questionnaire was administered via the web using 
SurveyMonkey™, an online survey creation and data collection tool. The survey contained an 
introductory cover page and the second page consisted of definitions of important terms such as 
offshoring, captive centers, third-party suppliers etc. The third page contained a screening 
question aimed to filter out service-provider, consulting, and other types of firms as the study 
purpose was to assess responsiveness of client organizations. Only those respondents 
representing a client organization were allowed to move further. All others were redirected out of 
the client survey. The last page of survey had a section where respondents could provide their 
contact information so that a copy of the summarized survey results could be sent to them.  
Data collection occurred between September and November, 2011. In the first wave of 
data collection, the research firm sent emails with a link to online survey to about half the 
subscribers. Three reminder emails were sent to this set one week apart from each other. This 
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resulted in 44 responses. The research firm then sent emails to the second half of their 
subscribers list. A reminder email, one week later, was also sent to this second list. The number 
of responses received from the second set of emails was 18. To increase the number of 
responses, we sent individual emails to approximately 550 subscribers. This personal outreach 
resulted in another 38 responses. Finally, we contacted approximately 30 executives at local 
firms within our region requesting participation. This effort resulted in another 10 responses. We 
checked for any significant differences among respondents based on these four different modes 
of contact as described in the next sub-section. 
Thus, a total of 110 people responded to the survey invitation. Out of these 7 were 
representatives of service-provider firms, 9 belonged to consulting firms, and 7 did not specify 
their firm type. All such non-client respondents were discarded and 87 client organizations 
related responses were retained. Additionally, three client responses were overwhelmingly blank 
and had to be removed. All this resulted in a final set of 84 client organizations (buyers of 
offshore services--either through third-party service providers or own captives) which was used 
in analyses. 
Checks for biases among the set of respondents: Given that the final set of 84 respondents 
were obtained from four different modes of contact (two separate mass emails and two separate 
personal outreach efforts) as described above, we compared these four groups using Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) with respect to two variables. ANOVA tests for Total Firm Revenue, F (3, 
75) =.90, p > .05, and for Total Number of Employees F (3, 79) =.69, p > .05 both indicated that 
there were no significant differences between the four groups on these variables. Thus, we 
combined all sets of respondents.  
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We compared early versus late respondents to approximate any differences between 
respondents and non-respondents. Following King and Sabherwal (1992) we compared the first 
1/3 with the last 1/3 of the respondents and discarded the middle 1/3 to ensure a clean separation 
between early and late respondents. ANOVA tests for Total Firm Revenue, F (1, 53) = 1.68, p 
>.05 and for Total Number of Employees, F (1, 55) = 2.13, p >.05, both indicated that there were 
no significant differences between early and late respondents. We also compared 40 of the 
known firms in this study (i.e. those firms whose names could be identified based on respondent 
information) with a sampling frame representative of the broader population of firms likely to 
engage in offshoring. Specifically, we compared the 40 known firms with the Fortune Global 
500, year 2011 list of companies
19
. Independent samples t-test in terms of 2011 Revenues 
suggested no significant difference t (538) = 1.176, p=.240. Additionally, we compared the 40 
known firms with the remaining 44 firms in our study, on all the study variables. ANOVA tests 
revealed no significant differences. 
Sample Characteristics: Table 1 provides demographic characteristics of firms in the 
sample. Overall, 49 out of 84 respondents (58.3%) provided a contact email for receiving a copy 
of survey results. 65% of firms had revenues of $5 billion or greater and 25.3% had revenues in 
excess of $40 billion. 79.6% had more than 5000 total employees and 24.1% had more than 
100,000 employees. The firms operate in a diverse range of industries. 27.9% percent of firms 
belonged to banking, financial services, and insurance sectors. Healthcare and Manufacturing 
firms had slightly greater than 10% representation each and 8.8% of firms belonged to the 
electronics and hi-tech sectors. There were no public sector or transportation related firms. The 
firms had their headquarters (home country) located in a total of nine different countries. About 
                                                 
19 Fortune Magazine, Global 500 List, Year 2011, Available online at: 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/full_list/. Retrieved March 22, 2012. 
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70% of these were United States based firms and 10.7% were based out of the United Kingdom. 
A majority of firms utilized third-party services providers for offshore services. 
TABLE 1 
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
 
 
 
REVENUES 
Category % 
Lower than US$250 million 6.3 
US$250 million - 1 billion 5.1 
US$1 billion - 5 billion 22.8 
US$5 billion - 10 billion 16.5 
US$10 billion - 20 billion 10.1 
US$20 billion - 30 billion 8.9 
US$30 billion - 40 billion 5.1 
Greater than US$40 billion 25.3 
Total 100% 
Number of Employees 
Category % 
0 to 2,499 Employees 12 
2,500 to 4,999  8.4 
5,000 to 19,999  21.7 
20,000 to 49,999 20.5 
50,000 to 100,000 13.3 
More than 100,000 Employees 24.1 
Total 100% 
Firms’ Headquarter Countries 
Country % 
Australia 1.2 
Canada 3.6 
France 4.8 
Germany 3.6 
Hong Kong 1.2 
Netherlands 2.4 
Switzerland 2.4 
United Kingdom 10.7 
United States 70.2 
Total 100% 
 
 
Industry 
Category % 
Aerospace and Defense 5.9 
BFSI: Banking, Financial Services and Insurance 27.9 
Consumer Packaged Goods 7.4 
Electronics & Hi-Tech 8.8 
Energy & Utilities 4.4 
Healthcare 10.3 
Manufacturing & Industrials 10.3 
Media & Entertainment 2.9 
Professional services/Investment 5.9 
Public Sector (Government, Education, Not-for-profit etc.) 0.0 
Retail 2.9 
Telecom 4.4 
Transportation 0.0 
Others 7.1 
Total 100% 
Dominant offshore models 
Information 
Technology 
a 
Business 
Processes 
a
 
Use Predominantly Captive 
Centers 
18.4% 18.9% 
Use Predominantly Third-party 
Service Providers 
65.8% 44.6% 
Use Similar Mix Across Captive / 
Third Party 
13.2% 16.2% 
a Percentages don’t add up to 100% 
 
Types of Third-party Service Providers 
a
 Used % 
b
  
Use Large Global Service Providers 42.9% 
Use Large Offshore Centric Service Providers 70.2% 
Use Smaller Offshore Service Providers 22.6% 
a See note below for explanation of these terms 
b Percentages don’t add up to 100% due to overlap 
n = 84 
 
 Global Service Providers: Also typically grouped as “Global Majors” are service providers which primarily 
originated in the US or Europe, and have since spread their operations to additional onshore and offshore countries. 
Such providers typically have less than 50-60% of their total headcount based in offshore locations. Examples: 
Accenture, ACS, Atos, Capgemini, Convergys, CSC, Dell Services (now includes Perot), AON/Hewitt, HP 
(Enterprise Services), IBM (Global Services), Unisys, and possibly others. 
 
Offshore-centric Service Providers: Also sometimes referred to as "Indian Heritage Service Providers” or 
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“Offshore Majors”; these providers started their operations in India, gradually built scale, and then expanded to 
other offshore and onshore locations beyond India. They typically have >70% of their headcount based in offshore 
locations, mainly India. Examples: Cognizant, EXL, Genpact, HCL Tech, Infosys, Mahindra/Satyam, Tata 
Consultancy Services (TCS), Wipro, WNS, and possibly others. 
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6.3 Measures 
Appendix 1 summarizes the measures and questionnaire items for all study variables. 
Dependent Variable 
 Organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures (Organizational 
Responsiveness): The dependent variable in this study is geared toward capturing organizational 
responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures within the context of organizations’ IT 
and BP offshoring initiatives. Given this purpose, our attempt was to assess whether 
organizations were heeding to calls for a reduction in overall offshoring and doing so specifically 
as a result of broader anti-offshoring pressures. Due to a lack of archival data we included direct 
questions that assess the degree to which organizational actions depict such responsiveness 
(please see Appendix 1). Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with 
four statements with respect to their organization’s responses to anti-offshoring pressures. All of 
these statements were anchored on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 indicates 
“Strongly Disagree” and 7 indicates “Strongly Agree.” Items assessed overall responsiveness, 
responsiveness in terms of IT offshoring and BP offshoring, and overall moves toward avoiding 
new offshoring contracts. For example, “[I]n response to anti-offshoring pressures, our 
organization has reduced or plans to reduce the overall extent of offshore delivery.” After 
subjecting these items to factor analyses and assessing their reliability we formed an index of 
these four items by taking their arithmetic mean to represent the construct organizational 
responsiveness (Cronbach’s α=.874).  
Independent and Moderator Variables 
Expectations of Increase in Social legitimacy: This variable was assessed by a direct 
question based on Oliver’s (1991) suggestions that senior managers may be asked about 
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“whether they expect compliance to increase their organization’s status or prestige (p. 172).” An 
item referring to the organizational expectations of increase in image as a socially responsible 
organization and organizational prestige was included—“We expect that our image as a socially 
responsible organization will be enhanced if we lower our overall extent of offshoring.” The item 
was assessed on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree” and 
7 indicates “Strongly Agree”. Higher ratings indicate greater expectations that lowering the 
extent of offshoring will enhance the organization’s social legitimacy. 
Dependence on Federal and State Governments: In creating this measure, we followed a 
traditional approach used in the corporate political activity literature (Hillman et al., 2004) that 
focuses on the percentage of revenues coming from governments as an indicator of a focal 
organization’s dependence on government. The item assessed dependence on sales from Federal 
and State Governments – “A fairly significant portion of our organization’s total sales 
(revenues) comes from Federal and/or State Government(s) as customers.” The item was 
assessed on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree” and 7 
indicates “Strongly Agree”. Higher ratings indicate greater dependence on government. 
Organizational plans for offshore portfolio: Toward the beginning of the survey, 
respondents were asked to indicate the size of their organization’s current offshoring portfolio 
(approximate offshore headcount in terms of Full-time Equivalent (FTE) workers). Following 
this respondents were asked of how their overall offshoring portfolio was going to change in the 
next three years. Response categories ranged from “Decrease by more than 2500 FTE” to “No 
Change” to “Increase by more than 2500 FTE”. Using this data, we created a dummy variable as 
follows. Those who indicated plans to increase the offshore head-count were coded as “1” and 
those who indicated no change or a decrease in offshore head-count were coded as “0”. 
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Complying actions of other firms: This variable was assessed in a manner similar to the 
dependent variable except that the referents for these actions were executives at other firms in 
the network of the focal firm’s executive – “I know of executives at other firms who have 
responded to anti-offshoring pressures by reducing or planning to reduce the overall extent of 
offshore delivery.” The item was assessed on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 
indicates “Strongly Disagree” and 7 indicates “Strongly Agree”. Higher ratings indicate greater 
responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures by executives at other firms in the focal 
executive’s network. 
Regulatory environment uncertainty with respect to offshoring: The conceptualization of 
environmental uncertainty in this variable is similar to what Milliken (1987) termed ‘State 
Uncertainty.’  It captures the extent to which organizational actors “perceive the organizational 
environment or a particular component of that environment, to be unpredictable (p. 136).” Thus, 
with the focus on unpredictability and a desire to consider uncertainty in relation to the Federal 
and state regulatory environment, we drew on the Miles and Snow (1978) perceived 
environmental uncertainty scale as the building block. This scale has been extensively used and 
has demonstrated good measurement properties (e.g., Buchko, 1994). The scale requires 
respondents to rate the specific characteristics or behaviors pertaining to environmental 
components such as suppliers and government regulatory bodies, in terms of their predictability. 
The anchors include 1: Highly Predictable and 7: Highly Unpredictable. We adapted the items to 
reflect the offshoring context, and focused on the regulatory environment. This resulted in the 
measure containing a total of 5 items pertaining to Federal and State Government(s) Regulatory 
Actions related to offshoring. The items capture, the degree of predictability of changes in 
overall tax laws or agency policies, data privacy/security laws, intellectual property protection 
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laws, hiring of foreign workers, and conditions surrounding fulfillment of state and federal 
contracts. Higher ratings indicate greater uncertainty. One item related to intellectual property 
protection was dropped during factor analyses. A composite based on the mean of the other four 
items was used to represent regulatory environment uncertainty (Cronbach’s α=.809). 
Success with Offshoring: In the interest of gauging overall success with offshoring as 
opposed to specific offshoring transactions, we drew on the Grover, Cheon, and Teng (1996) IT 
outsourcing success measure and other studies (e.g., Ross and Beath, 2006; Slaughter and Ang, 
1996; Winkler, Dibbern, and Heinzl, 2008) to create a six item overall measure of offshoring 
success. The approach was consistent with Grover et al. (1996) in that the items were geared 
toward assessing satisfaction with offshoring. Items covered aspects such as cost reduction, 
increased access to skilled personnel, improvements in overall flexibility, and increased speed to 
market or speed of delivery. Two items assessing overall satisfaction were also included (Grover 
et al., 1996).  The items were assessed on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 indicates 
“Strongly Disagree” and 7 indicates “Strongly Agree”. After subjecting these items to factor 
analyses, we created an index as the average of these six items to represent success with 
offshoring. Higher values indicate greater success with offshoring (Cronbach’s α=.872). 
Control Variables 
US Firms vs. others: While some industry reports indicate that the US is the largest 
market for offshoring and that US firms are likely to lead the increase in demand for offshoring 
services in the coming years (Iyengar, 2011a), other reports indicate that there is a slow but 
noticeable trend among US and Canadian firms to shy away from offshore engagements 
(Reynolds, 2011). To control for such possible effects we included a dummy variable related to 
whether a firm’s headquarters were within the US or outside of US. Respondents were requested 
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to answer the questionnaire with respect to offshoring from their organization’s headquarters 
(home) country. Respondents selected their home country from a list toward the beginning of 
survey. Organizations with their home country of United States were coded as “1” and all others 
were coded as “0.”  
Captive Operations vs. others: The nature of offshore engagement may also have an 
impact on the level of responsiveness to institutional pressures against offshoring. Prior research 
indicates that firms often engage in captive offshoring arrangements where they opt for internal 
control of offshore operations (captive offshoring) as opposed to or in conjunction with engaging 
offshore suppliers (Lewin et al. 2009). Captive arrangements involve greater investments of 
financial and other resources and are typically carried out by larger technology intensive firms 
(Carmel and Agarwal 2002). Although captive arrangements may be a stronger target for 
institutional pressures, they may be more difficult for firms to disentangle. On the other hand, 
captive facilities bring high risks such as of attrition of human assets which are highly mobile 
(Lewin et al. 2009; Manning et al. 2008). Respondents were asked to indicate the dominant 
model for their organization’s offshore engagement. The response categories included 1) 
Predominantly Captive, 2) Predominantly Third-party Providers, 3) Similar Mix Across Captive 
/ Third Party. Those who indicated either predominantly captive or some mix of captive and third 
party were coded as “1” having considerable captive operations and the rest were coded as “0”. 
Senior Most Respondents vs. others: Despite strong efforts to restrict responses to only 
senior executives, our lack of control in selecting potential respondents and the nature of this 
sample required that other respondents be included. Such respondents, although directly involved 
in the day-to-day operations may not be necessarily attuned to strategic overtones within an 
organization. Senior level respondents may be more aware of larger institutional shifts and their 
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strategic implications for their organizations (Sutcliffe, 1994). To control for this possible effect, 
we dummy coded respondents as senior most or not. Respondents indicating their job titles to be 
either at the Chief Executive level (various functions) or one level below it were coded as “1” 
senior level respondents and the rest were coded as “0”, not senior level. 
Internal Cost Reduction Pressures: We controlled for organizations’ internal pressures to 
reduce costs as cost reduction has repeatedly been cited as the top reasons organizations choose 
offshoring (Dibbern et al., 2004; Lacity et al., 2010). Such pressures could explain organizational 
responsiveness and may very well counteract any effects from institutional factors. This variable 
was measured with the item “Overall, there are pressures from within our organization to 
reduce costs for Information Technology (IT) and/or Business Process (BP) related services.” 
The item was assessed on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 indicates “Strongly 
Disagree” and 7 indicates “Strongly Agree”. Higher ratings indicate greater pressures from 
within the organization to reduce costs for IT and BP related services. 
Imposed Offshoring Restrictions: Institutional control describes the means by which 
pressures are imposed on organizations and one such set of means relate to legal or government 
mandates and a range of coercive pressures directed at organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1991). While, arguably, much may be going on in the institutional 
spheres with respect to offshoring, organizations may not directly feel the pressures to stop 
offshoring. On the other hand, those facing directly imposed restrictions on offshoring may be 
more responsive given government or legal mandate. To control for this important variable 
which may affect the degree of organizational responsiveness, we drew on Section 2 to measure 
directly imposed offshoring restrictions on organizations coming from four sets of constituents. 
Four items covered restrictions against offshoring imposed by Federal and/or State governments, 
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customers, legal and contractual obligations, and employees/unions. For example, “Our 
organization faces customer imposed restrictions on offshoring.” Two additional items covering 
overall imposed restrictions on IT and BP offshoring were also included. The items were 
assessed on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree” and 7 
indicates “Strongly Agree”. Two items were dropped during factor analysis. A composite based 
on the mean of remaining four items was used as an indicator for imposed restrictions on 
offshoring. Higher ratings indicate greater imposed restrictions on offshoring (Cronbach’s 
α=.882). 
6.4 Data Analyses 
 Moderated Hierarchical Multiple Regression analyses were carried out to test the 
hypotheses. Prior to proceeding with hypotheses testing, we assessed the construct validity of all 
multi-item constructs and checked if the data conform to other important assumptions of 
Multiple Regression. We discuss these below.  
Along with the steps taken during instrument development and refinement discussed 
above we took the following steps to further assess construct validity of the four multi-item 
constructs Organizational Responsiveness, Offshoring Success, Regulatory Environment 
Uncertainty, and Imposed Offshoring Restrictions. First, we performed Principal Component 
Analysis using Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization to ensure convergent and 
discriminant validity among the constructs (Straub, Boudreau, and Gefen, 2004). Principal 
Component Analysis requires that the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
(MSA) be greater than .50 for each individual item as well as for the overall set of items (Hair et 
al., 2006). The MSA for two items related to Imposed Offshoring Restrictions was below this 
threshold. These items were dropped in the first iteration. Further, one additional item related to  
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TABLE 2 
Factor Loadings and Cronbach’s Alphas for Multi-item Constructs 
Items 
a Success with 
Offshoring 
Imposed 
Offshoring 
Restrictions 
Organizational 
Responsiveness 
Regulatory 
Environment  
Uncertainty 
OS1 .657 .041 .071 .081 
OS2 .785 .140 -.003 -.082 
OS3 .832 .032 -.121 .068 
OS4 .791 .116 .072 -.112 
OS5 .755 -.022 -.120 -.252 
OS6 .689 -.198 -.129 .019 
 
RSTRCT2 .032 .670 .033 .183 
RSTRCT3 .038 .871 .154 .020 
RSTRCT5 -.039 .841 .156 .142 
RSTRCT6 .082 .864 .143 .096 
 
RESP1 -.054 .230 .785 .158 
RESP2 .009 -.003 .900 -.085 
RESP3 .099 .127 .895 .086 
RESP4 -.290 .178 .691 -.083 
 
UNCT1 -.103 .193 .090 .794 
UNCT2 -.007 .059 .092 .793 
UNCT4 -.155 -.011 -.105 .732 
UNCT5 .107 .235 -.011 .787 
Cronbach’s Alphas .872 .882 .874 .809 
Extraction /Rotation Method: Principal Component Analysis / Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
a: Appendix 1 provides the items as used in survey 
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Regulatory Environment Uncertainty was cross-loading on two factors. This item was also 
removed. For the final iteration, the MSA for all items was greater than .50 supporting their 
retention in the analysis. Further, the overall MSA for the set of items included in the analysis 
was .71, which exceeds the suggested threshold of .60 for overall MSA (Garson, 2011). The 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was also significant (p < 0.001). Communalities for all items 
exceeded the recommended threshold of .50 indicating that the constructs explain greater than 
50% variation in respective items (Hair et al., 2006).  Overall, the Principal Component Analysis 
showed four factors, as desired, with Eigen-values greater than 1. The four factors together 
explained 66.52% of the variance. All items loaded cleanly on their respective constructs and 
there were no further high cross loadings. The lowest loading was .657 which is well above the 
recommended minimum of .40 (Hair et al., 2006). Table 2 provides the factor loadings 
highlighted in bold for the designated constructs. 
We also assessed construct reliability. Cronbach’s Alphas for each of the four multi-item 
constructs, Responsiveness (α = .87), Imposed Offshoring Restrictions (α = .88), Offshoring 
Success (α = .87), and Regulatory Environment Uncertainty (α = .81) were well above the 
recommended .70 threshold (Nunnally, 1978) thus indicating good internal consistency amongst 
respective items representing each construct (Garson, 2011). Overall, these analyses suggest that 
lack of construct validity is not a threat to this study’s results. 
To check for potential outliers and their influence, we first checked the standardized 
residuals for all cases to ensure they were below the recommended value of 3.3 (corresponding 
to the .001 alpha level) (Garson, 2011). Examination of standardized residuals revealed that all 
values were below 2.0 indicating no potential outliers. We also examined the standardized 
DfBetas for all predictors across all cases. Standardized DfBetas measure the change in b 
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coefficients of respective predictors, measured in standard errors, if a potential case were to be 
dropped from analyses. All standardized DfBetas were below the recommended cutoff of 2 
divided by square root of sample size (Garson 2011). 
To check whether error terms were normally distributed, we examined the histogram and 
the Normal P-P Plot of regression standardized residuals (Garson, 2011). Both indicated that the 
error terms conformed to a normal distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (.068, p>.20) and 
Shapiro-Wilk (.985, p=.46) tests were both not significant indicating no severe departures from 
normality. To ensure that Heteroscedasticity was not a problem, we plotted the standardized 
regression residuals by the predicted values in a scatter-plot. Examination of the scatter-plot 
revealed a “random cloud of dots” and no consistent pattern--as desired (Garson, 2011). In terms 
of non-linearity, Garson (2011) indicates that this is in general not a problem if the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable is greater than the standard deviation of the residuals. The 
standard deviation on the dependent variable (1.28) in our analyses was greater than the standard 
deviation of the residuals (.78) indicating that non-linearity was not a threat. We also examined 
all partial regression plots and found no significant departures from linearity. The residual plot 
explained above in relation to Heteroscedasticity was also in line with the partial regression 
plots. 
Multicollinearity or the excessive inter-correlation of independent variables can be a 
serious threat for regression analyses (Aiken and West, 1991). High correlations increase the 
standard error of the beta coefficients and may mask the unique role of some or all independent 
variables (Garson, 2011). To minimize this potential problem in relation to the interaction terms 
and their main effect variables, we standardized all independent variables (including control 
variables but excluding dichotomous variables) prior to creating the cross-product interaction 
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terms (Aiken and West, 1991; Dawson and Richter, 2006). To assess this threat after running the 
regressions, we examined the Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for all variables. 
All tolerance values were well above the more stringent recommended minimum of .2 and all 
VIF values were well below the recommended maximum of 4.0 (Garson, 2011). The lowest 
Tolerance and highest VIF values were .273 and 3.664 respectively and belonged to a cross-
product interaction term involving a dichotomous independent variable. Further, all Condition 
Index scores were well below the cut-off value of 30 and also below the desired cut-off of 15. 
All these indicate that multicollinearity was not a threat for these analyses (Fox, 1997; 
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). 
 In order to minimize the threat of possible common method variance, we took some steps 
recommended by Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff  (2003). First, as noted above, 
reliability and validity of the measures were assessed before proceeding to hypotheses testing. 
The principal component analysis, using the study variables, indicates that none of the items 
cross-loaded on unintended constructs and highest cross loading was only .29 (Table 2). This 
suggests that common method variance was not strong enough to confound measurement of 
study constructs (Julian et al., 2008). Second, in order to ease the respondents’ concern of 
leaking critical business information, they were assured that the survey is completely anonymous 
and only summarized results will be reported. Third, to provide a reference of the degree of 
common method variance in the study, we conducted Harman’s one-factor test by entering all 
Likert-type items collected from the questionnaire into one principal components analysis. This 
obtained a solution with 18 factors with Eigen-values greater than 1 accounting for 80% of the 
variance. The first factor accounted for only 7.4% of the total variance which is less than one-
tenth of the total variance. Given no single factor accounted for the majority of the covariance 
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we had grounds for assuming that common method variance is not responsible for the study 
results. 
Hypotheses test 
 As indicated earlier, we used moderated hierarchical linear regressions with ordinary 
least squares method to test hypotheses. We first entered the five control variables to provide a 
baseline model (Model 1). We next entered the five (H1 to H5) independent variables in Model 
2, followed by the moderator variable (H6) in Model 3. Models 4 to 8 incorporate the five 
interaction terms between the five independent variables and the moderator. As explained above, 
all variables were standardized prior to multiplying them to create interaction terms. This was to 
reduce the potential problem of multi-collinearity between interaction terms and their respective 
main effect variables (Dawson and Richter, 2006).  
We assessed Hypotheses 1 to 5 based on the significance of b coefficients of the respective 
variables after confirming the overall significance of model 2. We assessed Hypothesis 6 based 
on the significance of the b coefficient in model 3 as well as the change in R
2 
between models 2 
and 3. Hypotheses 7a to 7e were assessed based on models 4 to 8 respectively. Significance of 
each of the interaction terms with the hypothesized signs and a significant change in R
2 
upon 
adding the interaction term was used to determine support for the respective interaction 
hypotheses. IBM SPSS Statistics version 19 was used for all analyses. To facilitate interpretation 
of the significant interactions, we plotted the significant interactions at high and low levels of the 
moderator variable using values one standard deviation above and below the mean (Aiken and 
West, 1991; Dawson and Richter, 2006).  
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6.5 Results 
Table 3 provides Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations at the measure level 
for all variables in the analyses. Table 4 provides the regression analyses results for 
organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures. Table 5 summarizes the 
results of hypotheses testing. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that the greater the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable 
from conformity, the greater the organizational responsiveness. As Model 2 in Table 4 indicates, 
the effect of social legitimacy on responsiveness is significant and positive (β = .36, p < .001) 
suggesting that organizational expectations for an enhancement in their image as a socially 
responsible organization are likely to result in their willingness to reduce the overall extent of 
offshoring. Hypothesis 1 was supported. 
Hypothesis 2 stated that greater dependence on governments would lead to organizations 
being more responsive. The coefficient for dependence in Model 2 is not significant (β = -.09, p 
> .05). Hypothesis 2 was not supported.  
Hypothesis 3 suggested that the greater the consistency of institutional pressures with 
organizational goals the greater the responsiveness. Model 2 indicates that the effect of 
organizational plans to increase offshoring was negative and significant (β = -.20, p < .05) 
suggesting that those organizations with goals to increase their offshore headcounts in the next 
three years showed lower levels of responsiveness as compared to those whose goals included 
lowering or maintaining their offshore headcounts. Hypothesis 3 was supported. 
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TABLE 3 
Means, Standard Deviations (s.d.), and Correlations 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. US Firm or Not .70 .46            
2. Captive Operations or Not .29 .45 -.17           
3. Senior Most Respondents or Not .59 .49 .15 -.22          
4. Internal Cost Reduction Pressures 6.05 1.34 .02 .03 -.02         
5. Imposed Offshoring Restrictions 3.27 1.49 -.06 .07 .01 .07        
6. Social Legitimacy 3.53 1.51 -.05 .02 -.12 .02 .47**       
7. Dependence on Government 3.28 1.93 .05 .06 .08 -.05 .43** .29*      
8. Org. Plans for Offshore Portfolio .73 .14 .15 .20 .19 -.16 .03 -.12 -.07     
9. Complying Actions of Other Firms 3.64 1.71 -.02 .04 .03 .02 .30* .33* .33* -.24    
10. Regulatory Environment Uncertainty 4.51 1.09 -.09 -.12 .28* -.01 .18 .20 .08 -.06 .28*   
11. Success with Offshoring 5.11 1.05 .04 .15 .01 .03 .06 -.24 .08 .14 -.15 -.05  
12. Responsiveness 2.87 1.21 -.13 -.18 .12 .15  .27* .47** .15 -.34** .50** .04 -.06 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
Two-tailed tests 
 
  
Khan, Shaji, 2012, UMSL, p. 70 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Results of Moderated Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Organizational Responsiveness
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7  Model 8 
         
US Firms vs. others -.17 -.16 -.17 -.18* -.18* -.18* -.18* -.22* 
Captive Operations vs. others -.20 -.17 -.19* -.20* -.20* -.19* -.20* -.21* 
Senior Most Respondents vs. others .09 .22* .23* .24** .25** .26** .26** .24** 
Internal Cost Reduction Pressures .13 .10 .09 .09 .06 .06 .05 .08 
Imposed Offshoring Restrictions .23* .07 .05 .01 .03 .04 .05 .09 
         
Social Legitimacy  .36*** .39*** .43*** .39*** .39*** .38*** .37*** 
Dependence on Government  -.09 -.10 -.07 -.10 -.11 -.13 -.12 
Org. Plans for Offshore Portfolio  -.20* -.21* -.24** -.23* -.24** -.25** -.22* 
Complying Actions of Other Firms  .39*** .40*** .42*** .48*** .48*** .49*** .49*** 
Regulatory Environment Uncertainty  -.24* -.24* -.23* -.25** -.25** -.26** -.28** 
Success with Offshoring   .13 .15 .16 .24 .25 .19 
         
Social Legitimacy X Success    -.20* -.22* -.22* -.21* -.20* 
Dependence on Govt. X Success     .17 .16 .19 .21 
Org. Plans for Offshore Portfolio X Success      -.10 -.11 -.08 
Complying Actions of Other Firms X Success       -.05 .01 
Regulatory Env. Uncertainty X Success        -.19* 
         
Intercept 3.19 3.38 3.41 3.44 3.39 3.41 3.41 3.45 
R2 .14 .48 .50 .53 .55 .56 .56 .58 
Adjusted R2 .09 .41 .42 .45 .47 .47 .46 .48 
R2Change (ΔR2) .14 .35 .01 .03 .02 .00 .00 .03 
Model F 2.52
* 6.85*** 6.49*** 6.72*** 6.68*** 6.18*** 5.72*** 5.86*** 
F Change 2.52
* 9.76*** 1.98 5.16* 3.44 .44 .20 4.10* 
         
Standardized regression coefficients are reported. n = 84. 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Hypothesis 4 stated that the greater the extent to which managers at a focal firm believe that 
executives at other firms are lowering their offshore engagements, the greater will be their 
responsiveness. Model 2 shows that the effect of complying actions of other firms is significant 
and positive (β = .39, p < .001). Hypothesis 4 was supported.  
Hypothesis 5 stated that the greater the level of regulatory environment uncertainty the 
greater will be organization responsiveness. The coefficient for regulatory environment 
uncertainty in Model 2 is significant but the sign is negative (β = -.24, p < .05) as opposed to the 
hypothesized positive effect. This indicates that organizations are instead less responsive when 
the executives perceive greater levels of uncertainty in regulations pertaining to the future of 
offshoring. Hypothesis 5 was not supported.  
Hypothesis 6 stated that the greater the level of organizational success with IT offshoring, 
the lower the organizational responsiveness. As Model 3 indicates, upon entering the success 
with offshoring term, there was no significant increase in R
2 
from Model 2 to 3 (ΔR2 = .01; F 
Change = 1.98, p > .05). The coefficient for success with offshoring in Model 3 was not 
significant (β = .13, p > .05). Thus, Hypothesis 6 was not supported.  
Hypotheses 7a to 7b were in relation to the moderating impact of success with offshoring on 
the five relationships under Hypotheses 1 to 5. Hypothesis 7a stated that success with offshoring 
will moderate the positive relationship between social legitimacy and organizational 
responsiveness such that the relationship will be less positive for those with high success with 
offshoring as opposed to those with low success with offshoring. Model 4 indicates that the 
interaction term between social legitimacy and success with offshoring is negative and 
significant (β = -.20, p < .05) as hypothesized. Further, upon entering this interaction term the 
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change in R
2
 from Model 3 to Model 4 was significant (ΔR2 = .03; F Change = 5.16, p < .05). 
The significant coefficient with the appropriate sign and significant change in R
2
 indicate support 
for Hypothesis 7a. To further explore the nature of this interaction, we plotted it at high and low 
levels of the moderator variable using values one standard deviation above and below the mean 
(Aiken and West, 1991). Figure 2a clearly shows that the otherwise strongly positive slope for 
the effect of social legitimacy on responsiveness becomes less positive when success with 
offshoring is high. Together, these results provided strong support for Hypothesis 7a. 
Hypothesis 7b stated that success with offshoring will interact with dependence on 
government such that it will make the otherwise positive relationship, less positive. As Model 5 
indicates, the coefficient for the interaction between dependence on government and success 
with offshoring is not significant (β = .17, p > .05). Further the change in R2 from Model 4 to 5 
was also not significant (ΔR2 = .02; F Change = 3.44, p > .05). Hypothesis 7b was not supported. 
Hypothesis 7c stated that success with offshoring will moderate the relationship between 
organizational plans to increase offshore headcounts and responsiveness such that it will make 
the negative relationship more negative when success with offshoring is high. Model 6 indicates 
that the coefficient for the interaction between organizational plans and success with offshoring 
is negative but not significant (β = -.10, p > .05). The change in R-square from Model 5 to 6 was 
also not significant (ΔR2 = .00; F Change = .44, p > .05). Hypothesis 7c was not supported.  
Hypothesis 7d suggested that the positive relationship between complying actions of other 
firms and responsiveness will be weakened when success with offshoring is high. As Model 7 
indicates, the coefficient for the interaction between complying actions of other firms and 
success with offshoring is negative but not significant (β = -.05, p > .05). The change in R-square 
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from Model 6 to 7 was also not significant (ΔR2 = .00; F Change = .20, p > .05). Hypothesis 7d 
was not supported.  
Hypothesis 7e stated that success with offshoring will moderate the relationship between 
regulatory environment uncertainty and responsiveness such that the relationship will be less 
positive when success is high as opposed to when it is low. Model 8 indicates that the coefficient 
for the interaction between regulatory environment uncertainty and responsiveness is negative 
and significant (β = -.19, p < .05) as hypothesized. Further, the change in R-square from Model 7 
to 8 was also significant (ΔR2 = .03; F Change = 4.10, p < .05) indicating support for Hypothesis 
7e. To further explore this significant interaction, we plotted it using one standard deviation 
above and below the mean of the moderator variable (Aiken and West, 1991). Figure 2b shows 
that the slope of regulatory environment uncertainty becomes more negative when success with 
offshoring is low when compared to when success with offshoring is high. Together, these 
results indicated support for Hypothesis 7e.  
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FIGURE 2a 
Plot of Interaction between Social Legitimacy and Offshoring Success 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2b 
Plot of Interaction between Regulatory Environment Uncertainty and Offshoring Success 
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TABLE 5 
Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results 
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable 
from conformity to anti-offshoring institutional pressures, the greater the organizational 
responsiveness. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the degree of organizational dependence on Federal and 
State Governments, the greater the organizational responsiveness. 
Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3: Organizations that plan to increase their offshore portfolio will be less 
responsive to anti-offshoring pressures than organizations that plan to maintain or 
reduce their offshore portfolio. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the extent to which senior managers at a focal firm believe 
that executives at other firms are curbing or eliminating offshoring, the greater the 
organizational responsiveness. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 5: The lower the level of uncertainty in regulatory actions of Federal and 
State Government(s) with respect to offshoring, the lower the organizational 
responsiveness. 
Not 
Supported 
(Reversed) 
Hypothesis 6: The greater the level of organizational success with offshoring, the lower 
the organizational responsiveness. 
Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 7a: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the 
relationship between the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable from 
conformity to anti-offshoring institutional pressures and organizational responsiveness: 
the relationship is less positive for those who report high, as opposed to low, success 
with offshoring. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 7b: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the 
relationship between the degree of dependence on Federal and State Governments and 
organizational responsiveness: the relationship is less positive for those who report 
high, as opposed to low, success with offshoring. 
Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 7c: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the 
relationship between organizational plans for offshore portfolio and organizational 
responsiveness: the relationship is more negative for those who report high, as opposed 
to low, success with offshoring. 
Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 7d: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the 
relationship between the extent to which senior managers at a focal firm believe that 
executives at other firms are curbing or eliminating offshoring and organizational 
responsiveness: the relationship is less positive for those who report high, as opposed to 
low, success with offshoring. 
Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 7e: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the 
relationship between level of uncertainty in regulatory actions of Federal and State 
Government(s) with respect to offshoring and organizational responsiveness: the 
relationship is less positive for those who report high, as opposed to low, success with 
offshoring. 
Supported 
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7 DISCUSSION 
This study examined the impact of the nature of anti-offshoring institutional pressures on 
organizational responsiveness to such pressures. The objective was to understand how firms 
respond to calls for lowering or eliminating the practice of offshoring. Offshoring has been a 
target of backlash from opponents who cite domestic job loss as its primary negative effect 
(King, 2005; Venkatraman, 2004). Yet proponents view it as the inevitable shift in a global 
economy with many positives, especially in terms of reduced costs for organizations (King, 
2005; Venkatraman, 2004). Given such reported benefits, firms may not be invariably responsive 
to institutional pressures and instead take their strategic considerations into account. Thus, we 
modeled organization’s prior success with offshoring as an additional predictor of organizational 
responsiveness and as a moderator of the influence of institutional variables.  
The findings are generally consistent with fundamental explanations of organizational 
responsiveness to institutional pressures that suggest that organizations do not uniformly 
conform to institutional pressures but adopt varying postures depending on the nature of 
institutional pressures that come to bear on them (Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1991). However, there are some surprising and some interesting results 
that contribute to both the information systems literature and organization theory in general. We 
discuss the findings below and describe their implications in a later section.  
The finding related to social legitimacy’s strong positive effect on organizational 
responsiveness lends support to a key institutional theory paradigm that organizations respond to 
institutional pressures in order to maintain or garner social legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996; Oliver, 
1991; Suchman, 1995). Expectations in increase of organizational image as socially responsible 
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by reducing overall extent of offshoring were strongly and positively related to organizational 
responsiveness. An interesting note with respect to the measure of social legitimacy in this study 
is warranted here. The measure of expectations in increase of social legitimacy was based on 
Oliver’s (1991) suggestions that executives be directly queried about such expectations. This 
approach departs from traditional conceptualizations of social legitimacy in terms of 
organizational size (e.g., revenues, number of employees). The argument with related to size as 
an indicator of social legitimacy has been that larger organizations due to their size and visibility, 
are likely to be under greater pressure to maintain their social legitimacy and hence be more 
responsive (e.g., Goodstein, 1994; Julian et al., 2008). Interestingly however, neither 
organizational revenues nor number of employees as indicators of size were significantly related 
to responsiveness in our analyses (not reported here). Nevertheless, the theoretical underpinnings 
seem to remain strong with respect to social legitimacy’s effects on organizational 
responsiveness. 
Dependence on governments, measured as percentage of revenues from government sales, 
was not related to organizational responsiveness. This finding is surprising given the strong 
precedence for the effects of dependence in the strategic adaptation and institutional theory 
explanations of organizational responsiveness (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Oliver 
(1991) suggests that greater dependence on pressuring constituents will lead organizations to be 
more responsive to constituent demands. One possible reason for this non-finding could be that 
governments may not be the only source of anti-offshoring pressures or perhaps a potent enough 
source – and this measure doesn’t fully capture dependence on other constituents and/or the 
nature of this dependence. In order to explore this further, we conducted post-hoc analyses for 
this hypothesis using three alternative operationalizations of dependence. We used extent of 
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government regulation for organizations, percentage of union representation in total workforce, 
and number of Information Systems employees within organizations. As indicated in section 2, 
unions have long argued against offshoring and are strong supporters of protectionist measures. 
Given this, the higher the percentage of union represented employees the greater the dependence 
and hence the greater the responsiveness. Similar logic was used for number of IS employees. 
Overall, all three alternative indicators did not change the results and were all not significant. 
Another explanation is that it is perhaps not dependence on such constituents that matters in this 
case but the multiplicity or conflict in expectations or demands among constituents that puts 
organizations in a precarious position – simple conformity in such instances is unlikely (Oliver, 
1991; Pache and Santos, 2010). 
With respect to organizational plans for their offshore portfolios the results suggest that 
those organizations that planned on increasing their offshore footprint in the next three years 
were less responsive than those organizations that planned to maintain or reduce their offshore 
headcounts. This finding is consistent with institutional theory accounts that suggest that, to the 
extent responsiveness to institutional pressures conflicts with organizational goals, organizations 
will be more likely to resist full conformity (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Pache 
and Santos, 2010; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991).  
The significant but negative effect of regulatory environment uncertainty on organizational 
responsiveness was in the opposite direction to our hypothesis. The results suggest that those 
organizations whose executives perceived greater levels of regulatory environment uncertainty 
with regard to offshoring were actually less responsive to institutional pressures against 
offshoring. This finding runs counter to Oliver’s (1991) theorizing that suggests organizations 
will adopt more responsive strategies when the environmental context of institutional influence is 
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highly uncertain and unpredictable (p. 170). One possible explanation for this reverse finding is 
that greater unpredictability in regulatory changes that could impact offshoring may not 
immediately translate into a need for lowering the extent of offshoring. This is possibly because, 
to the extent executives perceive that regulatory changes impacting offshoring are in fact 
predictable, they are more likely to take them into account in their immediate decision making. 
Such decisions may be, depending on what changes are perceived to be predictable, to either 
increase, decrease, or maintain offshoring. When any such changes are not predictable, then 
other things equal, they are likely to continue in their strategic course and adopt a posture of 
buffering their organizations from such unpredictability. For example, while organizations may 
choose not to lower the extent of offshoring given the unpredictability of impending regulation, 
they may adopt buffering strategies such as choosing to work with service providers who can 
shift from offshore delivery to onshore delivery if the need arises. This line of reasoning is 
consistent with Milliken’s (1987) arguments that  when the environmental context is not 
predictable, organizations adopt strategies to insulate themselves from sudden, unexpected shifts 
in the environment but do not commit to a particular strategic direction (p. 139). Future research 
may explore both responsiveness and other types of buffering strategies simultaneously as 
consequences of environmental uncertainty. Another possible explanation is that we focused 
only on the regulatory aspects of environmental uncertainty as opposed to including other 
aspects such as customers, competitors, suppliers, actions of labor unions, and financial markets 
(e.g., Miles and Snow, 1978). Inclusion of such other aspects may have changed these results. It 
is also possible that uncertainty in relation to different sectors may have different impacts on 
organizational responsiveness. Finally, it is plausible that this relationship is actually curvilinear. 
Overall, subject to further replication, this finding suggests that despite executives’ preference 
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for stability and control in their organizations, uncertainty in regulatory environment with respect 
to offshoring decreases organizational responsiveness. 
One of the most interesting set of findings from this research relates to how the effects of 
organizations’ prior success with offshoring come to bear on their responsiveness to anti-
offshoring pressures. The rationale behind inclusion of this variable was to assess how the extent 
to which success with an organizational practice or arrangement which is the very issue for 
institutional pressures, plays a role in organizations’ responsiveness to such pressures. The 
following results shed light on this question. 
The direct effect of success with offshoring (measured as satisfaction with overall offshoring 
outcomes) on organizational responsiveness was non-existent. We hypothesized that greater 
success with offshoring will result in lower organizational responsiveness. However, success 
with offshoring had no direct effect on responsiveness and remained consistently so across all 
models. Prior empirical work has shown that organizations are most responsive when 
institutional pressures and organizational considerations converge. Goodstein (1994) found that 
organizations were more responsive to institutional pressures for organizational involvement in 
work family issues when the technical benefits from responsiveness were also greater. His study 
included benefits in terms of organizational outcomes such as increased employee productivity, 
morale, and retention, among others. However, such logic doesn’t seem to extrapolate well based 
on current results. That is, the potential for losing out on existing benefits from offshoring did 
not at least directly lower organizational responsiveness. 
However, success with offshoring did attenuate the otherwise very strong positive effect of a 
key institutional variable. As results related to the interaction between social legitimacy and 
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offshoring success indicate, greater success with offshoring modified the positive influence of 
social legitimacy expectations on organizational responsiveness. Specifically, when offshoring 
success was low, social legitimacy had a strong positive relationship with organizational 
responsiveness. However, when success was high, the otherwise strong positive relationship 
became much weaker (see Figure 2a). This is perhaps the most interesting finding from this 
study. It highlights the dynamics of institutional and resource dependence explanations behind 
the motives of organizational responses to external expectations—in that, compliance to external 
expectations under the institutional lens may be viewed as self-serving while non-compliance 
under the resource dependence perspective may also be considered self-serving (Oliver, 1991 pp. 
149-150). 
This logic rests on the idea that both theories suggest organizations attempt to obtain 
stability and legitimacy, both assume that organizations may be interest driven, and both 
highlight the importance of obtaining legitimacy for purposes of demonstrating social worthiness 
and garnering resources (DiMaggio, 1988; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996; Oliver, 1991; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1991; Suchman, 1995). Under such logic 
then, Oliver (1991) suggests that the advantages of compliance from an institutional perspective 
include increased prestige and social legitimacy among others. On the other hand the advantages 
of non-compliance from a resource dependence perspective include the ability to maintain 
discretion or autonomy over internal processes and the flexibility to permit continual adaptation 
vis-à-vis the task environment. The results pertaining to the non-existent direct effect of 
offshoring success and the significant interaction effect with social legitimacy indicate that while 
strategic considerations do not blatantly result in non-responsiveness they do come into play in a 
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much more subtle manner. Next, we discuss the implications of the study results for research and 
practice.  
8 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
Recent developments in the outsourcing literature have highlighted the importance of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability for both buyers and service providers of 
global outsourcing (e.g., Babin and Nicholson, 2009; Brown, 2008). Ideas relating to CSR in a 
global outsourcing context range from philanthropy, to compliance with global standards, to 
collaborative efforts between clients and service providers to create social value (Babin, Briggs, 
and Nicholson, 2011). Such an approach is consistent with past focus on the implications of CSR 
in manufacturing and procurement in general (Drumwright, 1994) and essentially addresses what 
Basu and Pallazo (2008) term as the span of organizational commitment to CSR. While such 
focus is certainly valuable and worthy of attention, one contribution of this study lies in its 
suggestion that the implications of social responsibility may extend to the very notion of 
offshoring to begin with. In other words, while socially responsible offshoring is certainly 
worthy of further research (e.g., buyer requirements for offshore providers to provide CSR 
capabilities: Babin et al. 2011), considering the implications of CSR on the very business 
decision of offshoring is also relevant. For example, in terms of the extent to which an 
organization’s commitment to CSR manifests itself across various types of organizational 
activities, do business decisions such as outsourcing take into account the firm’s professed CSR 
approach, or are made without such considerations. Are firms with certain characteristics more 
likely to expend greater effort in stakeholder consultation prior to an offshoring decision (Basu 
and Palazzo, 2008)?  
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In a similar vein, the focus of extant IT and BP outsourcing literatures on the impacts of 
firm, transaction, relational, and governance characteristics on offshoring decisions is well 
documented (Lacity et al., 2010; Lacity et al., 2011). However, this study highlights the utility of 
incorporating both institutional and strategic explanations for offshoring. While institutional 
theory has been widely incorporated in the IS literature (e.g., Mignerat and Rivard, 2009), and to 
a certain extent for IT outsourcing (e.g., Ang and Cummings, 1997), its explicit consideration for 
offshoring had been relatively overlooked. In doing so, it addresses the call for consideration of 
the broader anti-offshoring sentiment in relation to offshoring (Lacity et al., 2010; Lacity et al., 
2011). For instance, a recent industry report by research firm Technology Partners International 
claims a noticeable trend among US and Canadian firms to repatriate once offshored jobs and a 
growing preference to keep outsourced work within their countries (Reynolds, 2011). Better 
understanding and explanation of such trends may require research consideration of both 
organizational and transaction specific factors as well as external institutional and task 
environment constraints. 
This study also has implications for the broader institutional theory applications within the 
IS literature. Specifically, the theoretical framework employed here considers the nature of 
institutional pressures as opposed to the more prevalent practice in the IS literature of focusing 
on the magnitude of pressures. While understanding the impact of the magnitude of mimetic, 
normative, or coercive isomorphic processes is important, this approach does not explicitly take 
into account organizations’ strategic or task environment considerations. Oliver’s (1991) 
framework on the other hand, accommodates such concerns more explicitly. Further, we 
modeled the organizational response on a continuum of responsiveness as opposed to strictly 
viewing compliance or defiance as is common in IS research (e.g. outsource/ not outsource, 
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adopt / not adopt). However, as mentioned in the limitations section, the current study does not 
go far enough in this regard. Specifically, we were unable to consider the different types of 
strategic responses (i.e. acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation) and 
the tactics within them. Mignerat and Rivard (2009) have lamented that a lack of consideration 
of  such a range of possible organizational responses remains an issue in the institutional theory 
based IS literature (Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). 
Finally, both the type of organizational considerations modeled and the type of institutional 
pressures studied in this research may improve the broader institutional theory based 
understanding of organizational responses. Such a theoretical contribution is possible as this 
study’s context allowed us to consider institutional pressures against (anti-offshoring pressures) 
what may be viewed as strategic actions (offshoring) of organizations. This approach goes 
beyond the traditional studies on institutional pressures for compliance and the technical or task 
environment organizational considerations in terms of costs and benefits of compliance (e.g., 
Goodstein, 1994; Ingram and Simons, 1995). Specifically, this study contributes in highlighting 
how the past outcomes of the very strategic actions (prior offshoring success) that are the subject 
of counter institutional pressures may shape organizational responses. 
9 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
This study has some implications for both client (buyers) and service-provider organizations 
in relation to offshoring. At the outset, the overall extent of organizational responsiveness to anti-
offshoring institutional influences was quite low. Nevertheless, there are some key aspects which 
come to bear. Consider this background first. This study found that when viewed in absence of 
other institutional factors greater imposed restrictions on offshoring faced by organizations led to 
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greater responsiveness. However, when viewed in conjunction with the nature of anti-offshoring 
pressures, the otherwise statistically significant effect of imposed restrictions became not 
significant. Similarly, organizational dependence on federal and state governments had no direct 
bearing on how responsive organizations were. Given this background, it seems that directly 
imposed restrictions on offshoring (coercive influences if you will) and organizational 
dependencies did not lead to greater responsiveness. This suggests that, either such 
restrictions/dependencies are not yet strong enough or that organizations are able to strategically 
manage them so as not to significantly alter their offshoring course. 
However, and instead, one of the strongest factors influencing organizational responsiveness 
was related to organizational expectations that reducing or eliminating overall extent of 
offshoring would result in enhancement of organizational image as more socially responsible. 
This finding suggests that social responsibility implications are far more potent than any direct 
pressures or organizational dependencies that would lead them with no choice but to comply. 
Thus, client organizations may seek to match their social responsibility approach, whatever it 
may be, with the very business decision of offshoring.  In other words, not only does an 
organization’s social responsibility approach apply during offshore engagements but it also may 
apply during the decision making related to offshore engagements. Of course, such 
considerations may not apply to all organizations and would need to be carefully applied 
depending on a firm’s professed social responsibility approach (Basu and Palazzo, 2008).  
In terms of service-provider organizations, this study indicates that along with social 
responsibility implications on offshoring decisions, mimetic influences from peer firms may be a 
potent factor in determining organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional 
pressures. Further, client organizations’ prior success with offshoring did not directly lower their 
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responsiveness but, more subtly, reduced the otherwise strong effect of social legitimacy on 
responsiveness. These findings suggest that the value proposition of service providers may also 
need to include aspects that address the social responsibility implications of offshoring decisions 
and such a value proposition may need to go beyond the process of offshoring itself. Further, 
service provider organizations may need to actively manage client perceptions regarding the 
future of offshoring given the rather potent effect of mimetic influences in shaping 
organizational responses. 
10 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study has several limitations that must be considered in interpreting its findings. First, 
in terms of study respondents, we could not draw a random sample from a known sampling 
frame. However, this set of respondents was ideal for the study purposes and access to such 
respondents would have otherwise proved very difficult in a random sample approach.  
Moreover, the firms in this study are likely to represent the broader population of firms actively 
engaged in offshoring. This is because subscribers in the email list we drew upon were actively 
involved with and interested in the topic of offshored services and in turn represent a diverse 
range of firms. The demographics listed in Table 1 lend support to such broad representation. 
The industry representation is also quite broad. More than 58% percent of respondents identified 
themselves and/or their firms. An examination of these firm names provides an additional degree 
of support that a majority of these firms were in fact large global organizations more likely to 
have considerable offshore engagements. Nevertheless, these results may have limited 
generalizability. Future replications and enhancements could draw on a random-sample of 
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publicly traded firms such that archival data on a variety of firm characteristics may be easily 
obtained and assessments of response biases carried out more potently. 
Second, the study takes a cross-sectional view on both the independent and dependent 
variables. The very nature of institutional pressures and their impact on strategic organizational 
responses may be best captured in a longitudinal design. This is because both the nature of the 
pressures and the organizational responses can be thought to change over time. Given a lack of 
archival data sources regarding the independent and dependent variables and in the interest of 
keeping this project feasible we resorted to a cross-sectional design. Although difficult, future 
research may capitalize on unique data sources such as the ORN Survey to incorporate a 
longitudinal design. Such a design may allow accounting for fluctuations (e.g., increased focus in 
election years) within the debate over offshoring itself. 
Third, we focused only on anti-offshoring institutional pressures and did not take into 
account that organization’s maybe facing “pro-offshoring” pressures from constituents such as 
consulting firms and powerful organizational actors such as the board of directors. In other 
words, there is a possibility of conflicting pressures on organizations with respect to offshoring, 
beyond their technical or operational concerns (i.e., we did control for internal organizational 
pressures for cost reduction). To the extent this is the case, organizational responses may be 
different as compared to when there is less fragmentation in the organizational field and 
consensus among institutional constituents on what is to be expected of organizations (Pache and 
Santos, 2010). This is an exciting area for future research. Divergence in expectations along with 
internal (organizational) representation of issues could be studied simultaneously with respect to 
organizational responses (Pache and Santos, 2010).  
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Fourth, most of the study variables were measured by a self-report questionnaire. Again, 
given the complete lack of archival data sources, this seems reasonable. Further, prior research 
has argued and shown that macro-organizational aspects, such as the focus of this study, are 
relatively less susceptible to mono-method biases compared to more micro-organizational 
concepts such as job satisfaction, stress, and turnover intentions (Ang and Cummings, 1997; 
Crampton and Wagner, 1994). However, future research may draw on other data sources to at 
least measure aspects such as environmental uncertainty using objective measures (Dess and 
Beard, 1984). 
Fifth, this study focused on the degree of responsiveness as the dependent variable. Given 
this focus, we did not predict specific response strategies (or tactics within strategies) as is 
possible using Oliver’s (1991) framework. Sample size restrictions and low availability of 
resources precluded such investigation at this point. Future research may incorporate a mixed 
methods design to first fully elucidate the variety of tactics organizations are employing across 
different strategies using a qualitative approach. Following this, researchers may conduct a large 
scale survey or draw on archival sources to predict specific strategies such as defiance and 
acquiescence. For example, while organizations may not directly acquiesce to institutional 
pressures, how likely is it that they will adopt some buffering strategies such as choosing 
offshore suppliers which can move offshore work back to an organization’s home-country if the 
need arises? 
11 CONCLUSION 
This study assessed the extent to which organizations are responsive to anti-offshoring 
institutional pressures by reducing and/or postponing their IT and BP offshoring. Further, it 
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attempted to explain the extent of organizational responsiveness based on both the characteristics 
of anti-offshoring institutional pressures as well as organizations’ prior success with offshoring 
while controlling for important organizational and external factors. In a descriptive sense, the 
results do not indicate an impending drift away from offshoring. However, an interesting set of 
findings emerged from this study.  
Neither internal pressures to reduce costs nor externally imposed restrictions on offshoring 
had any significant impact on the extent of organizational responsiveness. Dependence on 
government also had no effect. More surprisingly, prior success with offshoring did not directly 
lower responsiveness. Instead, a majority of variance in organizational responsiveness was 
explained by expectations of enhanced organizational image as socially responsible and mimetic 
influences from other organizations–both resulting in greater responsiveness. Further, conflict of 
institutional expectations with organizational goals reduced responsiveness. Greater regulatory 
environment uncertainty also resulted in lower responsiveness. While organizational strategic 
considerations in terms of success with offshoring mattered, their effect was not a blatant 
rejection of institutional expectations but a more subtle attenuation of the strength of 
institutionally sanctioned social legitimacy obtained from compliance. Expectations of enhanced 
organizational image as socially responsible did not lead to as greater responsiveness when 
success with offshoring was high. On the other hand, prior success with offshoring exacerbated 
the negative effect of regulatory environment uncertainty. Greater regulatory environment 
uncertainty led to even lower responsiveness when success with offshoring was high. 
As debate over the “true” macro-economic and societal impacts (positive or otherwise) of 
offshoring continues (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006), studying this issue further seems important for 
at least two reasons. On the one hand, to the extent one believes in the strategic inevitability of 
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offshoring  regardless of the anti-offshoring sentiment (Venkatraman, 2004) then understanding 
how potent is the impact of the institutional context in hindering or promoting offshoring 
becomes necessary. On the other hand, if one espouses that organizations should curb their 
offshore initiatives then understanding the efficacy/utility or lack thereof of the various 
institutional tactics geared toward obtaining organizational compliance becomes also necessary. 
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Appendix 1: Measures 
Unless otherwise noted below, all items were measured on 7-point Likert-type anchors where 1 
was “Strongly Disagree”, 4 was “Neither Disagree nor Agree” and 7 was “Strongly Agree.” 
CONTROL VARIABLES: 
US Firm or Not 
This variable was dummy-coded as “1” if a respondent indicated that his/her organization’s 
headquarters country was United States (US). All other countries were coded as “0” 
Captive Operations or Not 
Organizations having at least some captive operations in overseas locations were coded as “1” 
and those reporting no captive operations as part of their offshoring efforts, were coded as “0”. 
Senior Most Respondents or Not 
This variable was dummy-coded as follows. Respondents were requested to choose their job title 
category. The categories included:  
C-Level Executive (CEO, CFO, COO, CAO, CIO, CTO, CSO, CKO, etc.) 
Director, Executive VP, Senior VP, Vice President, Controller 
Department or Business Unit Manager 
IT or IS manager 
other (please specify) 
 
First, those marking “other” were appropriately categorized based on respondent specifications. 
Then all those respondents who chose either category 1 (C-level executive) or category 2 
(Director, VP etc.) were coded as “1” senior respondents, and all others were coded as “0”. 
Internal Cost Reduction Pressures 
Direct Question: Overall, there are pressures from within our organization to reduce costs for 
Information Technology (IT) and/or Business Process (BP) related services 
 
Imposed Restrictions on Offshoring 
RSTRCT1: Our organization faces Federal and/or State Government level regulatory restrictions 
on offshoring (dropped during factor analyses) 
RSTRCT2: Our organization faces customer imposed restrictions on offshoring 
RSTRCT3: Our organization faces other legal or contractual obligations that impose restrictions 
on offshoring 
RSTRCT4: Our organization faces employee/union imposed restrictions on offshoring (dropped 
during factor analyses) 
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RSTRCT5: Overall, our organization faces imposed restrictions on Information Technology 
Offshoring 
RSTRCT6: Overall, our organization faces imposed restrictions on Business Process Offshoring 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
Organizational Responsiveness 
RESP1: In response to anti-offshoring pressures, our organization has reduced or plans to reduce 
the overall extent of offshore delivery 
RESP2: In response to anti-offshoring pressures, our organization is scaling back or putting on 
hold originally planned growth in offshore delivery of Information Technology related services 
RESP3: In response to anti-offshoring pressures, our organization is scaling back or putting on 
hold originally planned growth in offshore delivery of Business Process related services 
RESP4: Our organization has decided to avoid signing longer-term offshore delivery contracts, 
at least within the next 12 Months 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
Expectations of Increase in Social Legitimacy 
Direct Question: We expect that our image as a socially responsible organization will be 
enhanced if we lower our overall extent of offshoring 
Dependence on Government 
Direct Question: A fairly significant portion of our organization’s total sales (revenues) comes 
from Federal and/or State Government(s) as customers 
 
Organizational Plans for Offshoring 
This variable was dummy-coded as follows. Toward the beginning of the survey, respondents 
were asked to indicate how their overall offshoring portfolio, in terms of Full-time Equivalent 
(FTE) workers, was going to change in the next three years. Response categories ranged from 
“Decrease by more than 2500 FTE” to “No Change” to “Increase by more than 2500 FTE”. 
Those who indicated plans to increase the offshore head-count were coded as “1” and those who 
indicated “no change” or a decrease in offshore head-count were coded as “0”. 
 
Khan, Shaji, 2012, UMSL, p. 101 
 
 
Complying Actions of other Firms 
Direct Question: I know of executives at other firms who have responded to anti-offshoring 
pressures by reducing or planning to reduce the overall extent of offshore delivery 
Regulatory Environment Uncertainty:  
[7 point anchors ranging from 1: Highly Predictable to 7: Highly Unpredictable] 
UNCT1: Changes in tax laws or policies with respect to offshoring are: 
UNCT2: Changes in Data Privacy/Security laws or policies that may impact offshoring are: 
UNCT3: Changes in Intellectual Property Protection laws or policies that may impact offshoring 
are (dropped during factor analyses) 
UNCT4: Changes in laws or policies that restrict offshore fulfillment of Government contracts 
are 
UNCT5: Changes in laws or policies pertaining to hiring of foreign workers (e.g. H1-b visa 
policies in the U.S.) are:  
Success with Offshoring 
OS1: Overall, offshoring has helped us reduce costs 
OS2: Overall, offshoring has helped us gain increased access to skilled personnel 
OS3: Overall, offshoring has improved our overall flexibility 
OS4: Overall, offshoring has helped us achieve increased speed to market or speed of delivery 
OS5: We are satisfied with our overall benefits from Information Technology (IT) offshoring 
OS6: We are satisfied with our overall benefits from Business Process (BP) offshoring
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Appendix 2: Summary of Key Challenges and Risks in IT Sourcing 
Summary of Key Challenges and Risks in IT Sourcing 
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Challenges 
and risks 
Descriptive phrases in the literature 
Select References on 
challenges and risks 
Note: A “1” under the columns of “Offshoring” “Outsourcing” and “Netsourcing” indicates the challenge or risk is 
pertinent to that sourcing initiative according to the literature 
1 1 1 Client's lack of 
IT maturity, 
experience with 
outsourcing, 
and inability to 
manage 
suppliers 
If an IT activity is poorly performing in-house and 
has been badly managed in the first place, will the IT 
managers be any better at managing an external 
provider? To reduce initial risks in outsourcing, a 
company must be capable of managing the IT service 
first... (Earl, 1996) Possibility of Weak 
Management... Lack of experience could lead to 
poorly defined scope and requirements... Lack of 
experience could give unfair advantage to suppliers... 
lack of offshore project management know-how by 
client... differences in development 
methodology/processes... client’s inability to manage 
the supplier 
Earl (1996) 
Jurison (1995) 
Sullivan and 
Ngwenyama (2005) 
Kern et al. (2002) 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
Hazel (2006) 
1 1 1 Suppliers' lack 
of IT 
capabilities 
Suppliers may not always maintain the latest in 
technology skills... Lack of domain knowledge… 
lack of experience with outsourcing… biased 
portrayal by suppliers… supplier's oversold 
capabilities...  Poor development processes… 
different standards... Outdated Technology Skills... 
etc. 
Earl (1996) 
Jurison (1995) 
Sullivan and 
Ngwenyama (2005) 
Kern et al. (2002) 
Sakthivel (2007) 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
Taylor (2006) 
1 1 1 Incomplete and 
rigid contracts 
despite 
endemic 
uncertainty 
with respect to 
IT 
IT operations and development are inherently 
uncertain. IT contracts should be flexible and allow 
for conflict resolution in face of inevitable 
uncertainties. To the extent this is not possible a 
company is better off keeping IT in-house. 
Earl (1996) 
Bahli and Rivard (2003) 
Kern et al. (2002) 
Sakthivel (2007) 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
Taylor (2006) 
1 1 1 Hidden costs Often clients underestimate setup costs, 
redeployment costs, relocation costs and longer than 
expected handoff or parallel running costs. Clients 
also underestimate management costs…. failure to 
consider all costs… increased need of coordination 
between business users of a client, IT staff of a client, 
and supplier's IT specialists could turn into a messy 
eternal triangle... all of these can erode the desired 
cost savings 
Earl (1996) 
Jurison (1995) 
Bahli and Rivard (2003) 
Sakthivel (2007) 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
Taylor (2006) 
1 1 1 Technological 
indivisibility/ 
Relatedness 
To the extent what is being outsourced is not easily 
broken down and highly interconnected, companies 
will face problems in terms of responsibilities… 
increased coordination efforts required… increased 
strategic dependencies 
Earl (1996) 
Bahli and Rivard (2003) 
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Challenges 
and risks 
Descriptive phrases in the literature 
Select References on 
challenges and risks 
1 1 1 Loss of control 
over data, 
security, and 
intellectual 
property 
concerns 
data security… intellectual property rights… national 
security concerns… regulatory concerns in financial 
services and other industries… court rules requiring 
availability and proof of integrity of electronically 
stored information… threats to security of 
information resources...  
Jurison (1995) 
Sullivan and 
Ngwenyama (2005) 
Kern et al. (2002) 
Kliem (2004) 
Sakthivel (2007) 
Goodman (2007) 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
1 1 1 Supplier lock-
in 
Supplier favorable power asymmetries… high 
switching costs may shield the vendor… few viable 
alternatives… highly specific assets… 
Jurison (1995) 
Bahli and Rivard (2003) 
Sullivan and 
Ngwenyama (2005) 
Kern et al. (2002) 
1 1 1 Loss of core 
competencies 
Fuzzy focus... loss of core... Contracting out key 
process areas… missing out on any strategic benefits 
of IT… treating IT as an undifferentiated commodity 
and being unable to exploit IT for competitive 
advantage… Loss of autonomy and control over IT 
decisions... a client loses the core group of people 
who were familiar with the activity and have 
expertise to execute the activity in-house... 
Earl (1996) 
Jurison (1995) 
Sullivan and 
Ngwenyama (2005) 
Kern et al. (2002) 
Aron et al. (2005) 
1 1 1 Suppliers' 
Financial 
Viability 
Supplier's financial instability… supplier may cease 
operations… supplier going out of business… is the 
offshore supplier financially stable… 
Sullivan and 
Ngwenyama (2005) 
Kern et al. (2002) 
Goodman and Ramer 
(2007) 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
1 1 1 Unrealistic 
customer 
expectations 
Client has inflated expectations of benefits from 
outsourcing/offshoring… failure to manage end-user 
expectations in offshore development projects… 
Kern et al. (2002) 
Sakthivel (2007) 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
Taylor (2006) 
1 1  Inability to 
obtain/retain 
human 
capital/Vendor 
staffing issues 
Although hoped for, the supplier may not have the 
best talent assigned to a customer account, while the 
client runs the risk of losing some of the better talent 
in house… lower productivity and skewed skills of 
supplier employees… 
Earl (1996) 
Sullivan and 
Ngwenyama (2005) 
Sakthivel (2007) 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
Taylor (2006) 
1 1  Business 
Uncertainty 
Business uncertainty in terms of long term direction 
and needs increases opportunity costs. 
Earl (1996) 
1 1  Loss of 
opportunities 
for 
Organizational 
Learning 
The strategic scope of systems often emerges as users 
learn what is possible and as the business context and 
needs change. By outsourcing a client may miss or be 
late in organizational learning opportunities 
Earl (1996) 
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1 1  Loss of 
Innovative 
Capacity 
Innovation needs slack resources, organic and fluid 
organizational processes, and experimental and 
intrapreneurial competences -- all attributes that 
external sourcing does not guarantee. If a company 
has outsourced and downsized as well, its ability to 
innovate may be impaired. 
Earl (1996) 
Hoecht and Trott (2006) 
1 1  Opportunistic 
behavior by 
supplier 
Opportunistic behavior by supplier… breach of 
contract by the vendor… opportunism… 
Jurison (1995) 
Sullivan and 
Ngwenyama (2005) 
Goodman and Ramer 
(2007) 
Aron et al. (2005) 
1 1  Internal 
Employee 
Backlash / Low 
Morale 
IT professionals and employees with clients, in 
general consider outsourcing and particularly 
offshoring as a threat to their survival and growth 
Kliem (2004) 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
Shao and David (2007) 
1 1  Communication 
problems 
Extended time zones… geographic distance… 
Language Barriers… geographic separation between 
client and vendor and limitations in communications 
and transmission systems… 
Kliem (2004) 
Sakthivel (2007) 
Goodman (2007) 
Aron et al. (2005) 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
1 1  Organizational 
cultural 
distance 
Inability of supplier employees to assimilate in 
project teams… different work styles… 
Kliem (2004); Lacity 
and Rottman (2008) 
1   Socio-Political 
Risks 
Trade barriers… border tensions… political 
instability in offshore destinations… animosity 
between cultures… exchange rate risk… sovereign 
risk… 
Kliem (2004) 
Sakthivel (2007) 
Goodman and Ramer 
(2007) 
Aron et al. (2005) 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
1   National 
culture distance 
Inability to resolve differences in values… culture 
shock… cultural and ethical differences 
Kliem (2004) 
Goodman (2007) 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
1   Negative 
impact on 
image of client 
political backlash against clients engaging in offshore 
outsourcing… back lash from labor unions … 
perceived as unpatriotic… 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 
(2008) 
Shao and David (2007) 
Smith and McKeen 
(2004) 
 
 
